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 One should hear the calling of two hyperbolic selfs within this questioning 
concerning what I would propose to call here the desire for panop-tech-clair-voyance: 
Selfless interpreted as an infinite reactivity (machinery) 
Selfless interpreted as an infinite responsibility (agency) 
 Reaction or response is what, according to Derrida, always classically 
partitions the human (agency) off from the entirety of the non-human an-agential (i.e. 
whether animal or machine). Within this oppositional coupling, of the reaction or 
response, the presumed cleanliness of a humanistic responsibility forms the self-
sealing benchmark or organising pivot par excellence. Reaction then would form the 
height of irresponsibility.  
 Outside of this partitioned history of such a safe ahistorical truth comes the 
imminent arrival, as we will soon see futurologically demonstrated, of certain 
‘invasive’ prostheses that will promise or threaten the return of the human to the 
status of that animal or machinic an-agency just mentioned. This threat or this 
promisei comes along however within a train that forms a component part of but a 
whole history of prior invasive woundings to the anthropo-centralised ego. Such 
wounds to the agency-of-the-human have come, according to a recent historical recap 
by Harawayii, within the numeric shape of four comparatively modern wounds to this 
once presumed safe base of the absolute human-whole: the Copernican, the 
Darwinian, the Freudian and now finally the Cyborgian. Somewhat fittingly however 
for such post-humanistic prostheses, attachments or (machinic) extensions, there 
seems to be within this final fourth wounding a notable lack of a proprietorial 
nomenclature, or of an anchoring proper name. This residence of the [C]yborgian 
wound lacks capitalisation. Can we perhaps question this acephalic lack of a named 
headiii and in return supply (which is not quite to buy into) the potent common 
currency of a founding biographical signature to act as supportive metonymic 
signage? 
 In answering to such a quest, we would offer here for our, as we will see 
panop-tech-clair-voyant, purposes the figure of the ‘Galvanian Wound’, named after 
the 18th Century Italian physician and physicist Luigi Galvani. As discover of the 
bioelectric properties of these “animal” and “human” nerve and nervous systemsiv, a 
whole subsequent arché or paleo-prosthetic pan-electrical truth system was unlocked 
within the very heart of the human envelope and thus was bornv the possibility and the 
potential to interface and “interfere” (for how can one now be seen to either invade or 
“interfere” with what was previously always already charged with such a currency-
of-the-electrical?) with “the human” via apparatuses that could lead, we might worry, 
toward the nameless monstrous bridge-being of a Frankensteinesque composited-
recognitionvi. More than such de-monstrositiesvii however, the galvanic wound opens 
or offers the inside up to the outside and allows for a veritable folding-out into the 
arbitrating open; an invaginational folding-out that would allow for an electrical 
archiving of what might in fact lie (and we obviously measure the semantic resources 
of this word carefully) beneath. The skin of the being-that-we-are is now no longer 
something that folds or better holds the inside, but which now conveys, through the 
trans-portalviii ontology of this wound, a connection or an availability. The galvanic 
skin responds and thus (now only) reacts? Response or reaction?  
 Does then this fourth galvanian ‘bio-electrical woundix’, this dehiscent 
ontological opening of the selfspace onto the sheer expansex of the otherspace, offer 
any directional cues to a location (for this abridged human-animal) of either a space of 
response or of reaction? And further, does this galvanian wound, so called, while 
forcing upon us the recognition of a now ontologised history of an always already 
pre-existing electrical interior, also involve an attendant concern or hope (depending 
on one’s point of view) of an additional turning toward a further techno-scientific or 
pragmatolgocial plunging into either Über-responsibility or Unter-reactivityxi? In 
other words does this recognition of the primacy of the bio-electrical interior offer 
either a promising or threatening furtherance of responsibility or reactivity 
respectively? Response or reaction? 
 
1. Selfless Responses or Selfless Reactions?  
 So, to rewind and remind ourselves of the doubling of the latter part of our 
opening titles, we are working here within the dual undecidable orbit of two futurally 
directed ends or solicitations of the semantic resources (or recourses) of this singular 
syntagmatic questioning concerning “immediation”.  Some concrete images of these 
somewhat ambivalently split ends: The first end is of the eschatological end, or of a 
perhaps quite worrying interpretation; where we worry that we ourselves and all of 
these human others, will lose our “selfs” and become just so many reactive machines, 
zoo animals or beehive dwellersxii (the death of the infinity of the Levinasian agential 
autrui?xiii). The second end is the more promising teleological promise of a self and 
an other driven or encouraged into a highly self-responsible selflessnessxiv by the 
affordances granted by the opening-up structures of the network; by being hooked-up 
to the sociality-of-the-social and thus to be brought or encouraged out of a previously 
protective, somewhat selfish, shell. Selfless then or self-lessxv, this self is thought at 
this prior-moment (as still existing before the encroachment of these futurially 
positioned ‘ends’) to be a singular separable “self”. It is just this specific idea, and 
this ideal, of a previously sheltered and homely ‘intra’ prior-privacy that we will later, 
toward our conclusion, be questioning further with our strategic pre-figurative use of 
our paleo-prosthetic galvanian wound (a pre-existent paleo-prosthetic process 
somewhat akin, we believe, to Derrida’s conceptually related networkxvi of concepts 
such as ‘invagination’, ‘différance’, ‘pharmakon’, ‘the trace’, ‘supplement’, ‘hymen’ 
and ‘arché-writing’). Before approaching this logical conclusionxvii however let us 
concentrate on the idea of a supposedly secondary prosthesis that would come along 
to cure a certain lack of being opened to the other. We must however remain 
suspicious of such notions of invasive secondarity and remember that the galvanic 
wound is primarily intimate. It does not come along any later than anything that 
would seem to be sealed away from it. 
 Something then is merely seen to be imminently coming along (we place our 
ear upon the tracks and some well-attuned ears can hear the approach) to steal this 
Cartesian ‘self’ awayxviii. The purpose of this paper, it must be made clear before 
examining our exemplars, is to cast or to sew some doubt around a supposedly pre-
existent, pre-im-mediatised ‘selfness’ that would pre-exist such an imminent 
approaching of immanence and some doubts also around the subsequent downstream 
modelling of a choice either of some hyperbolic surplus of responsibility in the face 
of this imminently arriving outsiding-of-the-inside or a hyperbolicxix deficit-
restrictiveness of reactivity (again in the face of the imminent arrival of an outsiding-
of-the-inside)  that a certain form of projected tele-techno-pathic engagement would 
seem to presuppose as delivering. The purpose of this paper then is not one that is 
fuelled by, or which would wish to therapeutically work-through, the operating of 
models of fear or of hope, but of a positing of a model of the human based upon the 
problematic of the reactivity of the human beforexx such machinery. It would not then 
be a case of worrying over the loss of a responsible self, or a self-responsibility, but of 
a questioning of such a site-of-the-self as the site of some quasi-transcendent self-
responding agency. Long before we reach these closing questions concerning pre-
panop-tech-clair-voyant reactivity we will concentrate here on a few exemplars who 
would wish to expand our humanistic horizons by unplugging us from previous 
restrictions and plugging us into the sheer expanse of the post or trans-human space. 
 
1.2 Posthuman Interfaces and Inter-Face-iality 
 Who or what parties could we call upon, as representing the promise of this 
currently encroaching post-humous self-lessness (of which at the moment we are self-
ed but soon to loose(n))? In such searching we could find, of course, no shortage of 
futurological exemplars who would, as a notional totality, see us as soon achieving 
the ability to raise and place ourselves squarely outside of this all-too-finite temporo-
spatial condition that we presently are constituted within; a new trans- or post- 
condition perfectly exterior to the confines of this self-hitherto-trappedness. These 
exemplars then are often commonly labelled and self-labelled as the post-humanists 
and the trans-humanists. We will very briefly look toward three such representative 
post-human resources or exponents from the transhumanist field before settling in 
some more significant depth upon our main cyborgianxxi case study or example. 
 Representing a potent post-human dose of hyperbolic responsibility there is 
John Perry Barlow. Projecting and protecting the a-domain of cyberspace Barlow and 
his somewhat kooky borderless border-guarding text “A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace”xxii forms the contour of a strong polemical opposition to 
those who would like to re-impose (i.e. those modelled on the national, etc.) 
restrictions on Internet communicativity; Barlow would here like to clearly re-echo 
some valuable founding-foundational sentiments that have been so palpably lost 
within the modern age of ‘restrictions’. For as electronically-freed techno-enabled 
Thoreauanxxiii tele-hunters, he believes that we should be able to hunt and comport 
ourselves out the within the cyberspatial open and boundless without any terrestrially 
‘positioned’ laws picking us up through any conventionally territorial Locardian 
exchange-values; localised-legal “values” that might tightly establish or prohibitively 
police our footprints and movementsxxiv. Cyberspace is a frontier and a properly 
lawless, open-source pathbreaking frontier that transcends and should transcend these 
pre-cyberspatial terrestrial localist restrictions. Upon this royal road to the 
unrestrictive place, we cannot help but step into some contradictions or potholes 
however. In relation to such models of de-territorialised disembodied space/s, we 
have investigated elsewhere a somewhat illustrative aporetic example of so-called 
tele-presence that problematises or unfurls some of the strange logic of this wish for a 
transcending of territorial regimes through the possibility of the actual hunting of 
animals placed within distant countries and shot via an internet connection. Questions 
of the undecidablity -not the indeterminacy- of the status or the exact coordinate-of-
the-kill and inter-spatiality were concentrated upon therexxv. Similarly, Barlow’s 
sovereignly separatist model of Cyberspace would wish not to touch down on any 
particular (lawbound) territory or its regimes or practices, even though it cannot help 
but touch down upon the very territories it nevertheless wishes to escape and evade 
being captured within. Needless to say, Barlow’s is an argument with and assault 
upon territor-reality that powerfully deconstructs its own premises and groundsxxvi. 
 Then there is Ray Kurzweill the technological futurist and sometime inventor 
of some concrete and very helpful ontical technological prostheses. To go along with 
this solid track-record of the creation of these useful groundfloor concrete-ontico-
practices, he has written two books full of predictions of future Moore’s law fuelled 
apparatuses; mostly centring upon predictions of the future-fact of being able to 
download our psyches into permanently-existing “mechanismsxxvii” and thus dispose 
ourselves of our aforementioned Platonico-Cartesian shells (as just so much innocent 
and now unnecessary baggage). In a sort of technological version of Fukuyama’sxxviii 
‘end of history’ or ‘last man’ argument (itself concerning the fall of another form of 
dialectical-divisive-dualist curtain) there is the powerful image of an ultimate 
synthesis or singularity that is near and that will soon end the longheld and somewhat 
problematically ‘finite’ (as his findings are findingxxix) sticking-point of this body and 
its tendency toward decrepitude and final closure. He is taking his food-supplements 
until soon, and somewhat luckily within his own lifetime, he and we can finally live 
forever: peter[pan]occhio? 
 Relatedly, and closing in upon our main post-humous quarry, or case study, 
there is George Dvorsky. Dvorsky, while ultimately sharing Kurzweill’s 
transhumanist predilection for and prediction of ultimate immortality, sees a more 
short-term achievable goal of an imminently-to-hand (that is, soon to be integrated 
into a networked everyday experiential ‘ready-to-hand’) invention of what he 
neologistically calls techlepathyxxx. He points out how recently Chuck Jorgensenxxxi, a 
scientist based at NASA, has invented a technology to implant reading-writing (input-
output) prosthetic technologies upstream from previously damaged or non-
functioning vocal apparatuses of some disabled subjects, by hacking or tapping-into 
nerve signals, situated within the throat, that control speech. These pre-verbal nerve 
signals, Jorgensen’s experiments found, operated in normal subjects whether or not 
they actually enacted the process of physically moving their lips. Thus he hacked into 
a region situated upstream from these lips, in a region situated notionally closerxxxii to 
the location of the human organism’s site of the intending-to-say; at some point 
spatially “earlier” then than this localised ontical sticking or “saying-point” that is 
broken in these particular subjects. As so often is the case, these injured subjects 
function as test cases, or pragmatically driven thought-experiments, for something 
much more radical and socially-encompassing (an upping-of-the-ante). For while the 
power of speech is then given-back or bestowed upon those once relatively closed or 
struck-dumb, this lucky or local repair job can form the basis of some more trans-
formational or trans-humanist success or proof-work. As a result then of these 
borrowings-of or burrowings-into these previously purelyxxxiii naturo-bio-
physiological signals, he points to the presence of a close-by somewhat unintended-
transportation or resource to help furnish the onward teleological journey (and as we 
will see, one set within an entelechialxxxiv family-circle) to the long-sought location 
that is telepathy.  
 It strikes him, in hearing about this space agency invention, that by the process 
of moving the prosthetic connection up a littlexxxv, up this anthropo-biological entity’s 
communicative-process chain, that we might totally cut out and expand these voco-
centric (I will not of course say phonocentricxxxvi) apparatuses out and then, as of 
waking up one simple morning, be able to communicate our very intending or 
meaning-to-say, without going to the (deferredxxxvii) trouble of actually having to say 
it. For he states: 
 “As I thought further about this similarity it occurred to me that the 
 technology required to create a technologically endowed form of telepathy is 
 all but upon us. By combining Jorgensen’s device and a cochlear implant with 
 a radio transmitter and a fancy neural data conversion device, we could 
 create a form of communication that bypasses the acoustic realmxxxviii 
 altogether. The dream of mind-to-mind communication and the desire to 
 transcend one’s own consciousness is as old as language itself. You could 
 make a strong case that there’s a near pathological craving for it, a tendency 
 that manifests through the widespread belief in paranormal telepathyxxxix. ESP 
 aside, it seems that this craving will soon be satisfied. Several advances in 
 communications technology and neuroscience are giving pause about the 
 possibility of endowing us with techlepathy. As we continue to ride the wave of 
 the communications revolution, and as the public demand for more 
 sophisticated communications tools continues, it seems a veritable certainty 
 that we are destined to become a species capable of mind-to-mind 
 communication.” (Dvorsky) 
 Speech and what it does will still be there, but will now (or at least ‘soon’) be so 
much clearer and cleaner. Such a will-to-cleanliness and the washing out of what 
might muddy communication haunts as well our main exemplarxl, who we will now 
move along to.  
 
2. Kevin Warwick and the Feeling of the Feeling of the 
Inside of the Significant Other 
 Professor Kevin Warwick works within the apparently very practicalxli 
environment of the University of Reading Cybernetics lab. Something of a media 
darling a few years ago (especially on a number of titillating “future-shock” and 
“future-sex” shows), Warwick has invented a series of subcutaneous or embedded 
prostheses to enable communication between, for example, 1) one’s own proper-body 
and the buildings which one owns (or perhaps work atxlii) and which are thus one’s 
extended propertyxliii; and 2) the ability to control technologies that operate across 
internet connectivity (with attendant benefits to medicine and of help in augmenting 
or creating various other tele-extensible ‘expertises’ unable “themselves” to travel) 
and finally, at least for our main purposes here, 3) an embedded batteriless chip that 
enables both himself (he loves being his own guinea-pigxliv) and his wife to share the 
(co-)presence or evidence of their internal “love chemicals” as evidence of their 
intimate pleasure within one another’s presence, without as a consequence having to 
worry about any previous uncertainties of any (perhaps) questionable vouchsafes-of-
the-voice or of any fogging or blocking-of-the-facexlv (that this technology then seeks 
to bridge and unblock). In answer to such untrustworthy bugs or glitches within the 
communicative realm, Warwick is intent on upgrading both himself and his wife Irena 
to henceforth avoid such difficulties. 
 For Warwick has invented himself as “the world’s very first cyborg” and 
believes in the future of highly integrated technologies that will expand our sensory 
and sensual milieus and radically alter our interpersonal environments or Umwelten 
and that these will help to form the very horizon or extra-intra coating or armature of 
our future post-humanity. Older forms of communication via speech and facial 
gesture will soon be on the wane. Warwick paints us a picture of just what major 
transformative upgrades await usxlvi. In his autobiography (or should we say his auto-
cyborg-ography?xlvii) Warwick states that our children’s children will “look back with 
wonder at how their ancestors could have been so primitive as to communicate by 
means of silly little noises called speechxlviii” (my emphasis). In a television 
interviewxlix that reported on a related implanting of chips into both his wife and his 
own nervous systems (and pre-faced with a section title reading “linking the brain 
with technology in order to upgrade the human species”), Warwick states: 
 “That was for me the most exciting thing scientifically thing that I’ve been 
 involved with. She had electrodes pushed into her nervous system, and with 
 my implant-electrodes in my nervous system, electrically [intonation in 
 original] we linked our nervous systems together. So what happened, 
 when she moved her hand ‘chuke-chuke-chuke”, my brain received three 
 pulses “chuke-chuke-chuke”. So we communicated telegraphically, nervous 
 system to nervous system, for  the first time in the world. Quite clearly now 
 communicating brain-to-brain is the next step” 
 Such replacements of external speech and of external sight by the replacement 
or upgrade of a more direct technological brain-to-brain ‘thought transfer’ (what we 
are proposing to call here panop-tech-clair-voyance) will finally transport us to the 
long awaited promised land or location of the behind-of-the-face-of-the-other and 
allow, as such, for a direct and immediate form of communication that will finally be 
able to edit or splice out any uncertainty or undecidability from our intimate and 
significant relationships. In logical extension of this technological bi-directional 
trussing, any ceremonial swapping of rings would no longer, through such a 
directness of connection, form merely the symbolic remainder or residue of a mutual 
coming together but will henceforth bind a unity through a direct technological or  
electric-blood circuitry (and as we will soon see, in genealogical-ancestral form, with 
Hegel below). For Warwick then, no longer will there be any, possibly, un-truss-
worthy speech act or any other speechless act of the body to be worried over, 
concerned by or questioned or really anything else that might fall outside of the 
encirclement of the ring (nor presumably, by extension, will the embarking-
promissory of the once necessary, though still perhaps perturbing, performative of the 
“I do” of the wedding ceremony any longer need to signature-stamp the opening of a 
marriage?) but will allow us to really share our real spirit and feeling with our 
significantly immediatised other (a shared space or an overlapped hearth of ipseity). 
For the faces and the voices that will once have projected our significant others ‘out’ 
to us will no longer form a possible undecidable barrier-entrance to what presumably 
lies beneath, but will provide a final cure for such uncertainty of these two sites of 
mediation of, for example, the pre-immediatised voice and the face: intimate as they 
are, these two communication devices also project or intimate a certain irreducible 
‘uncertainty principle’ or the possibility of a radical loss of meaning. Hence, in 
answer, the need for a device to intimately inter-face together with and to open up the 
previously hidden potential of the galvanian fourth wounding that we opened with. 
 
2.1  Of Certain Double Edged Gifts-of 
 For these latter “natural gifts” (of the face and of the voice) that one certainly 
presently greets (through our aistheses that enable a quite immediately-felt 
interpretation) with great pleasure and which one certainly loves-of-the-other and 
which give one so much food-for-desire-and-thought (gifts that allow the human 
subject to be-with-the-other, or of the Heideggerian significant otherly oriented mit-
da-sein) always immanently include an element, or at least the possibility of a risk of 
a deviation from the path-of-the-proper. Through the presence now of such prosthetic 
grafts, the family-plot of the couple can now truly thicken and blend into a unified 
onel. In the face of such thorny difficulties (of the face and of the voice) who could 
then argue that these secondary prostheses, though coming late upon the scene, are 
not themselves so much more primary than what they come along later to so 
secondarily augment? For surely the desires embedded within our seeking of the very 
behind-of speech and of the other-side-of the face; such “behinds”, for-the-sake-of-
which, we seek out our intercourse in the first place (the seeking for the catching of 
its sight/site). Intercourse has always already and intimately assumed then a distance 
of mediation that is, quite paradoxically, not the intercourse itself. In answer to this 
intercoursal-lacking Envois (Derrida) then are sent out through such intercourse, but 
the demanded closure of the destination is not touched upon enough (in its joint-core) 
so a second-order envois or envoy is always already pre-supposed by the failure of the 
primary internally-fissured envois to properly deliver its message and have it finally 
arrive. A algorithmic paradox then exists here for intercourse: Intercourse cannot trust 
intercourse as intercourse itself is not the aim or the teleology of the intercourse, as 
intercourse is thoroughly divided by its very own intercourseli. And this is the 
untouchable in itself. 
 Something, in excess, then cannot quite find itself being touchedlii within such 
activities of intercourseliii, even as-one is speaking, looking or touching upon the very 
matter of the other. What is sought-out within the operations of the sense organs is the 
envois (message) that apparently might lay, or perhaps “lie”, behind the inter-
coursal-touching and is then much more intimately at stake within the circulations of 
the game than the surface of the loved one that one makes contact with. Mediation (or 
intercourse) itself then, in this somewhat pre-Levinasian totalising model, is nothing 
but the embodied desire to erase itself as (de-)distancing (as a “materiality” that 
comes between).  
 The desire then is to both obviate and bridge and once bridged, the mediatory 
device (for this is now what we are calling these various ontical intercourses, in 
“sympathy” with this totalising model) disappears to become immediate: the ultimate 
teleology of speech or sexual intercourseliv here would reduce writing, as excess, from 
itself (as undecidability, improbability; difference) and of course as différance lv.  
 Thus, as with Dvorsky and his speech-thought based techlepathy, Warwick 
would now techlepathically connect and interface with his own wife’s very 
organismiclvi, as well as orgasmic, interiority and to be (rather than previously, 
perhaps, not determinably enough to be) his wife’s own intimate ipseic pleasure; a 
pleasure that he himself has gifted or given to her and most certainly and 
symmetrically vice-versa (more than simply a mise-en-abyme mirroring?). The 
previously dominant inter-personal, inter-spatial or inter-facial economy as excess-
beyond-total-exchange vanishes within a lossless and vastly reduced economy and a 
sort of joint interpersonal Umweltlvii arises within its previously divided wake. 
Obviously we are questioninglviii concerning this “techlepathy”lix or of what I would 
prefer to label here (to distance us from Dvorsky’s unproblematically inclusive term 
but also to bring out a Derridean overtone of “the envoi”) a panop-tech-clair-
voyance.  
 
3. Certain Philosophical Questions Concerning the Problem 
of Thought-Transference:  Hegel & Tele-Familiarity 
 A so-called pre-panop-technological clair-voyance, as we asserted, involves 
the desire of the reduction of the fog or the spatial interruption that is the distance of 
the aesthetic apparatus of sight from its interestlx on a grand scale. Clair-voyance, by 
definition, reacts from a distance and yet is as close and immediate as ‘being-their’lxi. 
This clear-vision (as the word translates) or augmented second-sightlxii at a distance, 
as well as forming the dream-life of many a historically concrete couple, has also 
been the concern of some prominent thinkerslxiii. Just as for Freudlxiv (as Derrida points 
out in his “Telepathy”lxv, where Freud played-with and leaned-toward telepathy as 
possibly existing inter-personal cashable currency of soul-exchange), so Hegel wrote 
some words on this subject for his own audience (also to be deliveredlxvi in the 
publically engaged situated lecture format) in talking a little about his own particular 
example and “use” of clair-voyance.  
 He was not however, as his English translator Wallace is at pains to point out, 
exactly sold on clair-voyancelxvii, but this lack of being-sold-on-it was not so much the 
result of a doubt as to its veracity (i.e. as something that actually can happen), but on 
its proper place within a communicative system or circuitry that places a pure 
(human) spirit pyramidically at the top and thus somewhat above its base level of 
intercourse. “Clairvoyance” then is primitive but it nevertheless does exist. So base 
though it may be, it still nevertheless does have a function to provide, if only as a 
powerfully figural illustration, within the circle of spiritual family values. Such an 
activity (of the figure of) clair-voyance can certainly travel well, if only to be tamed 
through figuration and symbolically transformed into the gold-standard or unity of the 
actuality of spirit. It is in this former figural aspect of its presence, at the very least, 
that it has a rather uplifted and upright existence. 
 It exists as something then that, within the grand Hegelian tradition, is to be 
lifted-up (the famously powerfully teleological Aufhebung) 
realm: a realm that, most importantly, centres around the inviolable solidity of a filial-
familial unity. In the particular passage of the lecture where Hegel talks of 
clairvoyance and the family unit together, we find echoes that closely approximate 
those of the aforementioned Freudian excursions into the family+telepathylxviii 
coupling. But there will soon be a problem that will inherently and intricately haunt 
these high functioning figurations, these telepathic family ties. We will have to wait a 
little longer to see these problems bubble on their surface.  
 Both of these excursions (Freud and Hegel’s) bind-to or feed-from the solidity 
of a blood-based family unit. For blood circulates through the channels of these 
distantly placed arché or paleo-prostheses and bring out within these channels of 
discourse only what is all together most proper, and thus already together, all 
together. The figure of blood that circulates through clair-voyance contains 
difficulties however, as we just alluded. Hegel himself states as much (and backed-up, 
as we will see in his footnotes, by certain conceptual clarifications of his English 
translator) in his ‘Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit’. He states within the universal 
first-person that: 
“The family tie constitutes my actuality. There can be people who, when in the 
external situation some change occurs, know about this in their own 
inwardness, their genius. So we have now to consider what exists in the form of 
presentiments. A man of forceful, sound self-feeling is bound to the usual 
condition of knowing. -But there are several examples in which, removed at a 
distance, a subject suffered a loss, nevertheless experienced an immediate 
sensation of that loss, believing that he had heard the noise or some such thing”  
                                      (Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, p130) 
 
“Clairvoyants also know about distant objects. The individual is actual, and to 
his actuality belongs everything that concerns him. Since clairvoyants know 
their actuality, and their actuality is this concentration of feeling, -they know all 
of this in an immediate way…” 
 
(208 Wallace reads: so they know of this without the mediation through 
which one otherwise knows of such objects existing outside oneself. They 
know in an immediate way).  
 
“This is particularly true of blood friends…”  
(209 Wallace adds: the same blood. Family is an ethical, but also a natural 
unity. Actuality of the one is substantially included in the substantial actuality 
of the other).  
“The sphere of actuality also extends to persons that interest one, belong to 
one’s environmentlxix, but extends further to such objects as belong to one’s 
circle and of which one can therefore know in one’s emotional life […]. Here 
belongs the phenomenon of ‘second sight’ of the Scottish […] Also the prophet 
Muller of Heidelberg can be mentioned […]. The occasion of his capability is 
noteworthy. At the death of his father he threw himself on top of his father, 
and with the most inner fervour prayed to God. The father was awakened, and 
this highest effort, this positing of the soul outside of itself, had fixed this 
predominantly emotional life in him.” (Hegel, ibid. p136) 
 The figure of the composited “blood-friend”. Thus distance and mediation are 
short-circuited in such clair-voyance by an immediation where blood flows within 
one large body composed of two geometrically distinct coordinates; a clair-voyant 
sang-clair that flows over and penetrates the barriers of skin and thus not at all 
anything like a haemorrhaginglxx out from an invasive wound. It is only through this 
blood that such communication can (ethically) flow. And yet simultaneously the 
blood must also simultaneously be composed of the social (hence the “blood friend”) 
which Wallace reads as composing of the “ethical and natural family”: one’s spouse 
that one has a bond of spirit with binds itself here by the placing of an immense, 
though hidden, weight upon the word “ethical” while placing a more open and 
seemingly clear weight upon the (seemingly less contestable) word family. Thus there 
is a naturalistic arché-responsible blood-bond that ties an ethics of the one to the 
other, without any “real” blood being present. All of the burden is placed upon this 
somewhat structurally uneasy bridge-term then of the “blood friend”. But what cannot 
be questioned, even apart from this questionable real-distance, is that blood is blood. 
But what of this blood that flows through what is not in fact in itself composed of 
blood? 
 
Back to the Future: Panop-tech-clair-voyance 
 In answer to this questing “but what of…” we come back to something, a 
spectral metaphoricity that is composed of blood but which, while not openly speak 
within this dialectics, is nevertheless fuelling our present exemplar (Warwick) and his 
embedded chip enabled panop-tech-clair-voyance. In such a panop-tech-clair-
voyance we would not be dealing with a secondary ‘invasive’ prosthesis (that would 
invade the prior-primacy of the a priori natural body-proper) but of a prosthesis that 
completes the call-of-blood. This call-of-blood will complete a lack that apparently, as 
with Dvorsky and his ‘techlepathy’ earlier, always needed to be completed. The love-
envoi sent out from the “blood-friend” (a rather inherently-aporetic appellation as we 
have just seen) receives something already close-by and already interior. It just 
completes it more, or signs most fully what was there already.   
 From a position where it was previously unable (through the seemingly 
inherent blockage of sensory-deprivation) to see inside we come to see the actually 
experienced position of the blood friend that so concerns Warwick and his pre-
inventionlxxi. A pre-invention in a long-long-long line commun-ication inventions. 
Again it is a long story whose recounting would seem to be coming to a present-day 
close: Warwick sees himself as carrying out the work and the challenges that would 
place him in direct filiation with the tele-technological communication apparatus of 
Alexander Graham Belllxxii (he would indeed like to be remembered as an inventor of 
similar life-changing, geo-space-bridging prestige). And, just as in the 19th century 
when technological photo-graphs and tele-phones were partnered by an occultish tele-
pathylxxiii, we come full-circle and find telepathy itself, to be no longer a spectral or 
occult thing 
 This is not however akin to tying two yoghurt cartons together with a piece of 
string in order to colloquy more immediately with our blood-friend loved ones, but 
more an super-intimate soliloquy of the (behind-the)face-to-face(behind). This would 
be something altogether more than a de-distancing electric speechlxxiv, but of a sort of 
panoptechlairvoyant electric immediacy. This bypassing of the previous externality of 
the face takes each of us/them inside them-us in a sort of intra-circuitous technico-
blood-grouping. But of the distance brought shorter, to disappearing..? Is there 
nothing more to say? Questions that we opened with of selfless otherness? Surely to 
connect so snugly to the other, we must already be at home most cannily within 
ourselves? And if we are soon to be together with each other, there must have been a 
privacy that can later be made to join within a new properly compoundedlxxv blood-
privacy? 
 If the history of mediation or communication has always also been a history of 
the desire for the bridging and the bringing closer of previously distant distances 
(according to McLuhan, Ong, Levinson’s ‘Digital McLuhan’, the 
systems/cyberneticists, etc.) and of vanquishing missing or errant excesses that might 
otherwise fall to the tomb (and whose seeds might not be deposited within the 
knowledge-bank) we have two questions perhaps to problematise it. One is the 
Levinasian ethical question concerning totality, another is the more “permanent” or 
ineradicable (and less ethically inclined) Derridean/Bataillian problem of a general 
economy and différance.  
 For economy of time we will move onto the second question concerning 
panop-tech-clair-en-voyance, the disappearance of différance. For unlike Levinas’s 
respect for the alterity of the autrui (and of the face as something that stops and starts 
our having-of-the-other), the possible bypassing of the facial does not for all that 
implode these alter-spatialities. For the self here is not, prior to this possibility of a 
solid-bridging, in control and possession of its owness, to then be able to take-control 
or totalise (and not leave to excess or infinity) that which comes before this spatial 
coming before (the other). 
 Is the self a self before it comes to wish to hold itself out to the other? Is the 
self a monad looking for something outside, itself? Does the self need to build a 
prosthetic bridge toward the other, or is the prosthetic of the bridge-outside already 
inside? For Derrida we are perhaps always already telepathic and thus always already 
invaginationally wounded: 
 The truth, what I always have difficulty getting used to: that 
 nontelepathy is possible. Always difficult to imagine that one can think 
 something to oneself, deep down inside, without being surprised by the 
 other, without the other being immediately informed, as easily as if he or she 
 had a giant screen inside. (Derrida, Telepathy) 
 And yet, we still seek to supplement this arché-telepathy, but perhaps the 
better to hide or bury ourselves away from this prior techclairvoyant substratum that 
we have always already so thoroughly been composed of? Remember the galvanian 
wound of the arché-electrical. Prostheses of prosfetishes do not hide away a lack but 
offer the threat or the promise of an extension to hide the existent alreadyness of a 
prior extension beneath the apparent prior lack of this invasiveness. Just as for Leroi-
Gourhan the hand is not in any way invaded by the prosthetic tool but already 
available for it and calling-out for it in its very shape and ability to grasp or clasp onto 
what is outside, so the body (as galvanic already, but more as vibrating with 
invagination) is a quite uncanny abode: not of itself but of what is thought to be 
prosthetically outside.  
 In a twist on Haraway’s desire to have responsibility given to (to 
Christianise?) the animal -after Derrida’s question of animal possibilities of response- 
we might ask: and say the human reacted and has only ever reacted? What if the 
responsibility of the individual was only ever the panop-tech-clair-voyant machinic 
reaction of the other, of an alterity, inside? A reaction machinery unable ever to stand 
or have stood on its own two feet in any responsible way? 
 “[T]hen comes the last stage, the one that is still before us, but that I see 
seeing us coming and that softwarily, will have anticipated us right from the 
start. In this way a life is totally transformed, converted, paralysed by 
telepathy would await us, given over to its networks and its schemes across the 
whole surface of its body, in all its angles, tangled up in the web of histories 
and times without the least resistance on our part”  (p243)  
 Such threats, offered within the voice of the somewhat camp quotation above, 
offer a return to a poverty of world, but where for all that were the riches? What 
would be a resistance where, in truth (?) a solidity ground has always already been 
lacking? 
 For here we spot a contradiction or a strange aporetic cut within Haraway’s 
somewhat celebratory cyborgian fourth wound and one that Luigi Galvani already 
helped to have us recognise as dehiscent or open. Galvani’s electrical-technical 
interior does not seek to open a chasm, an abyss, or a wound between the animal and 
the human but to wound the safe biblical distance of a safe anthropocentric division (a 
division of which both Heidegger and Uexküll also partake of). In rightly seeking to 
question this rather neat divide however, why give responsibility unto to the animal 
and thus share out something of the human “individual’s” presumed possibility of 
answer from the bottom of an owned-responsibility? And so, without wishing to re-
establish the dividing line between the human and the animal, we might ask the 
question: “and say the human reacted?” 
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  i	   This conceptualization of the possibility that there could be something as 
perverse as a promise (i.e. rather than a more usual threat) of a restrictive or 
entrapping animal-return (as well as the more obvious threat to the responsible 
agency that such prostheses would pose), may of course strike one as a little 
sadomasochistic as a desire to have. But it has indeed often been recognised 
within various fora, that a humanistic gift-but-burden-of-responsibility that would 
separate us out from ‘the animal’ is so often also simultaneously pre-theoretically 
“experienced”, and then reflected upon, as the fused or implosive promise-threat 
of an accompanying double-edged sword. In answer to this Christian (sometimes 
also, it must be said, a Christianised and relatively weak-atheism) image of a 
cleanly divided human “presence-responsibility” engine, the possibility of a future 
return to the other side of the seemingly unbridgeable abyss where the animal-
reaction nexus resides, would tap into a certain image of a returnable relief-of-
responsibility through a return to a notional pre-responsive total 
institutionalization (a sort of Goffmanesque relinquishing of the human’s 
presumed freedom of movement that would take place outside of such an ontic 
biological total institution and instead just be the way we are, anywhere we are) 
that would relieve the very “human burden” of an undecidability of choice and 
thus the responsible-decision that is commonly seen as a responsibility to a 
future as what is open to, or dependent upon, our decisions. By the erection of 
such penetrative prostheses that offer up the image of a promise of a return to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
certain un-obliged reaction (commonly en-figured as the futurological image of a 
totally closing totalitarian regimen where any individual responsibility-of-choice 
exists no longer), a certain release from responsibility would be perhaps promised 
and the ultimate diminution of an open or expanse that terrifies in its very 
plasticity. This paradoxical and composite intricate-entwining, of the unified 
double-edged threat-promise, we will importantly be exploring here within the 
mere seeming empirical domains of some supposedly merely technical devices of 
embedded communications (such is often the self-image of the proponent of such 
technologies also: the ordeal-of-the-undecidable is reduced toward a unity: 
here, in our example, in the form of a spouse’s responsibilities of being-in-a-
relationship). Such innocently practical communications and bridging or bringing 
devices indeed, as we will see, do require some conceptual unpacking (we are not 
within the restrictive technoscientific domain of the merely technologically ontic 
(Heidegger 1982), in this question concerning the teleological horizon of 
techlepathy that we will be looking into, but are entitled to step back to ask some 
ontological questions that are questions such practioners also ask themselves. 
Clarification: by “ask themselves” we mean that these are not questions that 
we are asking as errant critical outsider intruders into a purely technological 
space but that these are questions that the technology is already asking itself 
within the very intimate and immanent erection of itself within its practices). In 
connection to this intimate-immanent pre-theoretical asking we will also look 
later, through the work of the early C20 zoologist, or biosemiotician, Jakob Von 
Uexküll (and also through a recent recap of Uexküll’s work by Giorgio Agamben) 
and his Hamburg based Umweltforschung (umwelt -or environment- research), 
at such an idea of reaction as a lack of response through the powerfully 
metaphoric image of a simultaneously imprisoning-transparent soap bubble that 
entraps and allows only for reaction that would be a total de-individuation (for 
some of a pessimistic hue see the threat/promise of these apparatuses is that 
such prostheses will take away, or vampirically drain, a previously  certain-
responsible self). We will also look at certain concrete communications 
prostheses that, unknowingly or not, draw or feed from the current or currency 
(within their immanent pre-marketing or promise) of the powerful cybernetic 
systems-image of the imprisoning well-oiled machinery of the ur-image of a 
beehive that would form all components (once called ‘selves’) into a restrictive 
economic total institutional existence. It is interesting, in this regard, to note (and 
then save for some further reflection later) how the arch dramaturgical analyzer 
of the staging techniques of human institutions, one Erving Goffman, opens his 
meditation on the encircling spatiality of the “total institution” through his own 
ur-example of an asylum system, that we might easily exchange for the imagery 
of such a beehive:  
 “Every institution captures something of the time and interest of its 
 members and provides something of a world for them [my 
 emphasis]; in brief, every institution has encompassing tendencies. When 
 we review the different institutions in our Western society, we find some 
 that are encompassing to a degree discontinuously greater than the ones 
 next in line. Their encompassing or total character is symbolized 
 by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside [my  emphasis] 
 and to departure that is built right into the physical plant […] These 
 establishments I am  calling total institutions.” (Goffman, Asylums, p.4) 
I have quoted this at length here as it captures something of the potency of the 
imagery of a previous or blockaged world of human respons-ibility become an 
infinite (“something of a world for them”) total-word-of-reaction that we hope 
ourselves to capture within an exploration of the fears and desires of certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
emerging intricately relationally networked or data-based tele-techonolgies. Again 
however, to stall or question the wish-fulfilled working of an imagery of some 
previously azure clear responsive freedom, we would wish to point toward a 
certain historical or genealogically networked operating of such imagery, as well 
as a strong and very concrete prior history or genealogy of a networking of the 
spatiality-of-the-other that does not have wait until now, or soon, to get going. 
We do not need to wait for any emerging computational concept of “networking” 
for this to be so (for such a computational concept is itself obliged or is itself 
networked into such a concrete history of a network that precedes networks). 
This then is not of ‘the new’. For we will ask, even outside of such a networks-
genealogy: where is or was a pre-networked ‘responsibility’ in a perfectly 
individual or indivisible sense before such recent or encroaching tele-technological 
prostheses that would make of us nothing but a rekindled bee? What is the 
outside, before this bee-network (this beeing-in-the-network)? And such a bee 
would not have access to the nectar of responsibility. 
 Grandcentral networking paradox itself: In answer to this image of a 
hyperbolic-reactivity we find the answerability of a rather symmetrical hyperbolic-
responsibility that, in a sense, comes full circle to encroach upon the spatiality of 
its other. For also here we often find a certain powerfully inhering image of an 
outside already existing and ensconced within a supposedly free or sovereign 
inside (for it is, of course, said that one does have responsibilities). As we will see 
later, this image of an organic and unquestionable already-inside of an outside 
that one is unquestionably responsible toward-which and inherently drawn out 
toward (through Hegel’s ontological networking concept of the “blood friend”) of a 
certain naturalistically  privileged outside will help to develop the work of a proto 
or pre-panop-tech-clair-voyance that any secondary or technological panop-tech-
clair-voyancy (i.e. the ontic development of…) apparatuses would do nothing but 
to solidify, repeat or innocently re-affirm this innately-inhering-desire. The 
apparently occult or mystical foundations of these authorities (the natural right to 
inspection or of the teleological functioning of an immanent archiving of the 
significant other) will furnish powerfully ideological and invisible support 
foundations or functions for the very concrete building of these ontical prostheses 
themselves (an authority that, in all of its implicit power, does not need in any 
way to be consciously situated, cited or re-visited, as of ‘an’ or ‘The’ authority, as 
we pointed out earlier in this footnote). Finally (and we will concentrate on this 
later, and in some considerable detail) in building embedded or bio-integrated 
technologies that would wish to erect a prosthesis for a sense apparatus of 
telepathy that is itself of a seemingly occult status, this occult itself was never 
such an errant or strange splinter within the economy or housing of the supposed 
empiricism of the  ‘I’, but is nothing (and yet something) more than a solidifying 
of what is most familial and thus already together, all together (i.e. it is not an 
errant image). Techlepathy then already has a place staked out in advance for 
itself, just as telepathy held a place of supreme importance (even for those who 
misbelieved its possibility of proof-readiness). The summative algorithm of the 
latter part of this rather long footnote: If telepathy does not in fact exist as a 
sense apparatus, at least we are now in a position to invent it! ii	  As we will see towards the end of this study, Haraway is quite far and away 
from occupying a univocal or unequivocal position vis-à-vis the status of the 
animal (in the reductive singular). Indeed her usage of the Derrida of ‘The Animal 
That Therefore I Am’, as a friend or companion at her pan-biologistic “mess 
table”, is equally far from being safely or univocally demonstrated or indeed 
secured. The cyborgian wound that Haraway opens for our attention and the 
somewhat pan-spatial position of the animal that she believes that Derrida helps 
to prize open this wound up with, by asking the question of the status of an 
individual agential response on the part of an-animal (here a cat, an empirical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cat, in front of him in his bathroom one fine day): the question that Derrida asks 
in asking “And say the animal responded?” does not however stop dead in just 
one direction (of a reaction-becoming-response: the animal being now granted a 
place at the table or of holding a responsible stake within the game) but can be 
seen also to move the question equally in quite the opposite direction. We can 
ask (and later we will) whether response is such a safe-extensible category? 
Derrida rarely stretches one category to cover, supplant or take-over ‘the other’, 
so we hope in view of this ontological lack-of-directional-closure to close our 
conversation with a question concerning the reaction and its undecidable stretch 
over the domain of the seemingly safe response (through our case study of 
panop-tech-clair-voyance). We might worry, further, about the status of a 
relatively simple ‘pan’ stretching of the category of “responsibility” as a curative 
or sublative to a dualist conception that places or parcels the animal as reactive-
human-opposite and which thence ties up all of the ends (the ends that we have 
here opened with) or whether the conceptual category of this response/reaction 
opposition would be sufficiently problematised by stetching either end of this 
duality to cover or obviate the other. While we will certainly, at the close of this 
argument, be problematising Haraway’s stretching and inclusive opening-up of 
the category of responsibility (an opening up that would include the animal as a 
companion or ‘fraternal’ ‘friend’ and which sometimes, in her descriptions, indeed 
verges on the cartoon comedic but also, less humorously, on the dangerously 
reactionary: for she can say within her theory of the ‘Companion Species’ that a 
laboratory animal is a partner in experimentation!) by provisionally coming in the 
opposite direction with a human given covering of reaction, we hope to unsettle 
or to shake this conceptual framework in a much more undecidable direction 
without obvious end. An impressive book that redresses a tendency to reduce 
deconstruction to the ethical (albeit, it must be said, much more impressive 
shapes than Harway’s: Critchley, Bernasconi, etc.) takes something away from 
the gift-of-responsibility of the human and infinite answerability that certain 
forms of atheism share with Christianity. The book ‘Radical Atheism’ (Martin 
Hägglund) seeks to uncover some of the relatively hidden detail that would make 
of atheism something often quite theistic. Derrida is his key lever in this with 
concepts such as essential corruptibility and the inherent possibility of the 
effacement of the trace. In (shared regard) to responsibility he states: 
 But to deny this inevitable risk, to deny the essential corruptibility of 
 responsibility or to project its consummation in an ideal future, is to deny 
 the condition that makes responsibility possible in the first place. (p.106) 
iii Though we do, of course, see the irony of this lack of a head (acephale) in 
usefully foregrounding a certain lack of responsible ownership, an irony quite 
useful for the forwarding of an idea, and thus a certain sense of properness in 
reflecting the concept of, the cyborgian itself (and why the proper name is a 
humanist nomenclature and should thus perhaps be replaced by something more 
numeric in spirit, such as one Fereidoun M. Esfandiary famously using ‘FM-2030’). 
In supplying the placeholder of a name to such a ‘place’ we do not seek to 
redress or to resupply the gravitational pull of a founding humanistic locale and 
thus to supply or excavate some lost recognition or own(ership) to a pastly-
present pure participant or owner of a founding or foundational deed. For it must 
be said that in lacking a name of such previous wounders as “Copernicus”, 
“Darwin” or “Freud”, the Cyborgian wound does not for all that struggle free of 
the founding recognition of what only the presence of a name could supply, but 
also partakes of the idea(l) of an irreducible location that just as much seeks to 
break free or provide a breach from what was previously taken to be safe (before 
this name or signatory came forward to perform the opening of the wound). On 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the contrary, in supplying ‘Galvani’ as a signatory, marker or name for the 
wound, we seek instead to provide all the more the position of a ‘non-place’ or 
topography (not a founding hero-ism) that stretches back far before the name. In 
supplying the name ‘Galvani’ as an index we see a place of pressures, 
experiments and accidents and a place that does not then for all that belong to 
the personage of the one who is seen as stumbling upon what the name marks 
out as incomparable. This is not an attempt to establish proprietary naming rights 
but to place at our dispoal some usefully magnetic pictures of what is at stake 
within a particular expanse of time, while also, of course, to follow through and 
outward to some of the attendant echoes accruing from the mark ‘Galvani’ that 
subsequently feeds into skin responses, foldings-out, the right to inspection and a 
certain allowance or vision of the body as something no longer containing or 
being proper only to itself (as it now, as we say, invaginates or folds into the 
outside). It is then not at all an attempt to bring back a propriety (within the 
useage of our own Galvanic Wound) that the ‘cyborgian’ moniker might have 
itself so easily overcome simply by disposing or dispossessing us of the 
properness of the proper name. 
iv This Galvanian fourth wound then is not a singular but a double-wound, for in 
being both bio-electrical, in and of itself, and common (across “the cleave”) to 
both the so-called human and so-called animal, two once safe borders become 
invaginated within a format that problematises two supposedly distinguished 
temporalities. Also, and more importantly, we feel that the concept of a 
‘cyborgian wound’ gives the dull and safe impression of something still 
nevertheless outside (even if we would no longer hold any, historically enforced, 
right of barring entry), whereas the archaic intimate knotting (for there is nothing 
earlier) of the galvanian wound, as we will see immediately below, is a very 
primary-prosthetic (or anaprosthetic) that functions to question the very idea of a 
singularly secondary invasive prosthesis. Galvani called for the recognition of 
what he called “intrinsic animal electricity” (as opposed to some extrinsic 
excitation of something from without), and so for Galvani there would be nothing 
cleanly or clearly cyborgian to come to supervene upon or to come along later as 
an attachment to bring or import such electricity inwardly (we will see the 
importance of this important, and thus not at all local, conceptual clarification in 
the footnote below regarding the historico-politically interesting case of ‘Galvani 
Contra Volta’) 
v Now this birth, this recognition, was the birth of a recognition in all senses. This 
final wound to the enveloping pride, like these previously recognised wounds, is 
not some explosive prosthetic invention that comes invasively along from some 
errant technological exterior coordinate, but is a discovery of something always 
already interior. This wound then is not an invention that offers a practical 
distance from previously more observational discoveries (Copernican, Darwinian 
Freudian) of a prior-existing nature, but is itself an injurious recognition of 
something always already prosthetic. Here then we would mark out within this 
wound a substantial distinction or difference to the previous three wounds: the 
intimate presence of a secondary techné at the heart of the primacy of physis. It 
is then nothing late coming. For as far back as ‘back’, the paleo-prosthetic 
electrical interior that Galvani helped us to recognise was already doing its firing 
and its sparking, even as those ignorant yet noble cave men were trying to spark 
up and ignite their first primal fires and then later pre-scientifically mythologising 
the sending or arrival of these gifts. And much later on, but still comparatively 
long ago, our closer but still somewhat naïve ancestors may worry about a certain 
illicit trade or of the stealing of something improper to our supposed prior nature; 
something dangerously additional but nevertheless safely distanced by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
placement of a coordinate position that is perfectly external. We now recognize 
that one can be supplemented by too much of what we already have; a 
supplementation of something dangerously internal. The very harm that this 
electricity can do is not because it invades something that was altogether empty 
of it, but instead comes about through the overloading of a circuitry that can only 
take so much extra current, currency or charge. “Whenever” the dividing line 
occurred that struck man down, or built man up from a previously reactive 
“animality” (and like the sparked-fire, later mythologised as either supplied or as 
stolen away), this electrical interior, this charge that finally always drains away 
from us, finds all life living under its temporary protection (hence the wound to 
our animal separation anxiety). But this is a double-edged recognition that offers 
something futurial just as it takes away something we thought to be altogether 
anterior: new images of capture and storage electrical circuitry are offered in 
substitution or replacement for a prior blood-replacement mythology (for we are 
thinking obviously of vampires as escapees of the imprisoning of the double-
edged settings of the sun) with an electrical systems-theory that simply 
interfaces with just a suchlike supplemental expansion of its already-own.  
vi Again, to recognise this monstrous-monster, after this wounding that we now 
uncannily cognize and have since then come to “know” via the enlightened 
investigations of Luigi Galvani, it is not then the mere supplemental “lately”-
invasion of some errant extra-monstrosity, but of a monstrous-city already 
internal to our previous “nature”. Obeying here then the integral rulings of 
Kristevian abjection, the symbolic vomiting out of this integral integrated 
imag(in)ery is nothing but the somewhat difficult (to say the least) recognition of 
an image already really inside as real-ity. A strange logic-of-the-pictor-real is 
residing in in-alien-able-residence here (and we use “pictor-real” here as a 
hyphenated portmanteau to point toward a certain strength or adhesion of 
embeddedness within the very operating of real of the representation: no longer 
then a distanced or detached reproduction) in this place of the intimately 
dissonant unheimlich. Something ensconced safely inside does not come to 
imagine the horrors of something purely outside, but is thoroughly (and already) 
economically invested with its invaginating electrical-code (and we should not 
forget that the economy or the Oikos etymologically arises or takes its functional 
breath from the safe navigation of the family circle of the home as opposed to 
what might divest it of its encircling vestments). Within then such an intimately 
and inherently sutured electrical code then there really is nothing worryingly or 
architectonically foreign to code-break-into, and here the horror itself resides. 
The firewall is nothing but a very (nothing but) porous myelin sheathing that 
itself conducts the charge (Julius Bernstein’s ‘Membrane Hypothesis’ took 
Galvani’s work on bioelectricity forward into the realm of the working of cells 
within electrophysiology and neurophysiology. The myelin sheathing in 
conducting such an intimate electrical charge if or when stripped, our archival-self 
is itself of course lost as it itself is nothing but this electrical resting/excitation 
potential). Also, in underlining the presence of a supposedly abiologistic-
prosthetic within the very heart of the bio-Élan-vital, the quantum physics 
theorist Nils Bohr said of Galvani that he demonstrated “an intimate combination 
of the laws of inanimate nature with the study of the properties of the living 
organism” (quoted in Focaccia, ). 
vii We would see here a double-facing de-monstrosity that monstrates and de-
monstrates somewhat simultaneously: the Baron Frankenstein’s unnamed 
monster’s monstrous presence is allowed or brought-about by the art/ifice 
(techné) of being able to composite or to piece together, through a supposedly 
secondary late-coming electrical charge, what was already charged within its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
prior intimate-interiority (of what each of the pieces were already composed). 
This late arriving “secondary” electricity however seems to interrupt a proper 
circuitry of circulation that should be put into motion only via a proper birth from 
a proper-womb. The secondary-womb that (constructing a “hideous progeny” 
Shelley, p.ix) adds a secondary-charge, and which runs across or which 
monstrously sutures (what should be) the gaps of dead pieces, adds a false-life 
or a second life that can never outrun or live up to the live truth of the primary 
prior-primacy. Such a secondarity should clearly be placed, or will inevitably find 
itself, by itself, dropping down, into the flames. But this secondarity is a 
pharmakos, or a scapegoat, for something more primary. 
 This then is not anything at all like a pre-sewn-up or natural end for such 
satanic secondarities. Shelley, in the preface to her own modern-technologised 
Prometheus (the “hideous progeny” of a non-natural birth, that is not the 
famously virginal form of a bypassing of coitus) casts a secondary or composite 
hue upon the really quite electrically unified figure of the galvanic. For things are 
not so pre-settled, as Luigi Galvani had ably demonstrated (and which, as we will 
see, forms an intimate-secondarity that a competitive colleague, one Alessandro 
Volta, could not conceptually come to terms with): Intimate Animal Electricity. 
And this prior-intimacy follows the itinerary of a recently theoretically expanded 
path of the dangerously primal supplement. For a primary-primacy finds itself 
haunted or seconded through a Derridean logic-of-the-supplement which 
cannot help but see (though the wishfully cleansing-abjective flame of a 
vomiting-abjection would most un-certainly hope to bury or to cast-off this 
unease) the illicit writing work of this electricity as already present and charging 
the very intricate-intimate-interiority of what is now not most proper (intimately 
not most proper). This fire all too easily burns their very own fingers, as their 
fingers are composed of it itself (the technological signage of a writing-death are 
internal to the very integuments, vestments or in-vestments of speaking-life, as 
Derrida has analogically shown (analogous to our strange galvanian logic) in the 
dangerous logic-of-the-supplement in ‘Of Grammatology’ and within the strange 
logic of the operating of the Pharmakon in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’). The algorithm: a 
supposedly primary physis is always already a secondary techné: thus a paleo-
prosthesis. 
viii According to Jakobson there are three forms of translation, transposal or 
transportation from one notional position into another. While two of these are 
notionally linguistic (intra-linguistic, for example in rewording, or of swapping 
signifiers, for better audient understanding while inter-linguistic occurs for the 
sake of a pleasant journeying between two language systems that are notionally 
foreign to one another; in swapping signifiers for what would hopefully be 
relatively stable signifieds), a third sense of ‘translation’ has to do with the 
translation between one semiotic system and another. One such semiotic system 
is the language of the galvanic skin response. Once discovered or recognised as 
a trapped and untapped form of communication then instruments can be invented 
and invested for the reading or the interpretation of such ‘utterances’: another 
system (for example an exemplary speech-based linguistic one) is necessary to 
read-off these traces or movements. Just as Freud reads hysteria as but a series 
of symptoms of something beside itself, in itself, we have the presentation of a 
new interiority not previously having been available to be read or indeed known-
of (reading forms the nexus-instrument of such possibilities of systemic 
exchange) or fathomed. A prior secrecy (existing outside the level of 
intentionality or attentionality) then is uncovered where previously it was 
secreted away, entombed or hermetically encrypted, quite away from an 
inspecting sunlight that might be cast upon it. Never really then quite hermetic, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
this place is now opened and placed within the opening of the hermeneutic circle. 
With such an open and in-secured availability and while also hardly uncovering a 
secret in-secrecy, the engine of the archiving-open runs to burrow deeper toward 
that notional core and translates it outward into a publically available language or 
discourse. No longer analogue it is merely a question of digital reproduction and 
transposal. It is also nothing new and only furthers the notion of a psychoanalytic 
uncovering of the core. For the goals of public praxis as science and the 
continuing fulfillment of the long tradition of unconcealment was always Freud’s 
avowed goal (and, interestingly, why the figure of telepathy forms such a spectral 
figure in his ‘Dreams and Occultism’ lecture: “does it exist?” in which case we 
have a discovery of science, or “does it not?” in which case psychoanalysis will 
discover other reasons or psychic compulsions for the symptom-itself-of-
telepathy). This ambivalence concerning telepathy in relation to psychoanalysis’ 
status as a science, but of a science open to the other (even if that other must be 
brought within a safe-sphere of being opened), is interestingly explored 
(especially in terms of reference and exchange with Derrida’s playful uncovering 
of these unassimilable psychoanalytic remainders) by Royle in an essay titled ‘The 
Remains of Psychoanalysis: Telepathy’. Here he points to the unassimilable 
figuration that telepathy assails, or wounds, the Freudian wound with. As 
mentioned in note ** above, translation and trans-portation within the panop-
tech-clair-voyant desire-systems, that we will shortly be looking at, take or 
incorporate (or introject?) the figure of telepathy as a prosthetic goal that is not 
in any need of a prior ‘a priori’ natural-existent-telepathy. Here then (and really 
quite originally) we would have a prosthetic supplementation of a sort of 
mystical sixth sense whose empirical existence or empiric extension is, of course, 
highly uncertain (as a mental image to help focus or estrange this idea for 
thinking: the construction of a prosthetic extension of something uncertain in its 
existence could we picture the construction of a prosthetic “God Machine” as a 
prosthetic supplement to such a famously occultish uncertainty principle? If God 
is not at the beginning will he be at the end as a sort of prosthetically infinite 
answering machine?). Returning to the conceptually more manageable terrain of 
telepathy and its possible extension from a zero degree via prostheses: Here we 
would perhaps then be techno-scientifically supplementing or prosthetising a 
myth or indeed a ghostly naked lack (which we would hazard to term a 
prosfetish?). Within this latter and quite pragmatically oriented science of the 
prosfetish then there is not the worry of status of discovery that so haunted 
Freud but the invention of a prosthetic system that would induce the presence of 
what previously was perhaps merely the domain of certain occultish desire. Such 
an occult would be the engine of this regional output of an ontic technoscience, 
but an occult that merely voiced a desire spread somewhat more generally. For 
some interesting discussion of the problem of ‘discovery’ and ‘invention’ in 
relation to other related worries and problems of prostheses, read Derrida’s 
excellent essay titled ‘On the Afforementioned Human Genome Project”. Also 
Mary Shelley herself in reflecting on both her own creation (Frankenstein) and her 
creation’s creation (the unnamed monster) reflects upon the problematic border 
between a natural discovery and a prosthetic or artistic invention:  
 “Everything must have a beginning, to speak the Sanchean phrase; and 
 that beginning must be linked to something that went before. The 
 Hindoos give the world an elephant to support it, but they make the 
 elephant stand upon a tortoise. Invention, it must be humbly 
 admitted, does not consist in creating out of void, but out of chaos; 
 the material must, in the first place, be afforded: it can give form to dark, 
 shapeless substances, but cannot bring into being the substance 
 itself. In all  matters of discovery and invention, even of those that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 appertaing to the imagination, we are continually reminded of the story of 
 Columbus and his egg. Invention consists in the capacity of seizing on the 
 capabilities of a subject, and in the power of moulding and fashioning 
 ideas suggested to it.”  
 (Shelley, author’s own introduction to Frankenstein, p. ix) 
  
Shelley, reflecting upon artifice and specifically her will be going on to talk about 
how her own creation, rather than her creation’s creation came about (although 
she does unearth symmetries between her fictionising self and the fictionised 
Baron’s fashioning of the monster) , questions invention as a secondary originary 
act and brings it back to a prior supporting network that, as it were, pre-invents 
or invests the invention with a spark that precedes it. Discovery is the seat or the 
egg and cannot be questioned or peeled back, even if invention comes under 
some metaphysical scrutiny. 
ix On the famous Galvani versus Volta controversy. For a while it seemed that the 
experiments of Galvani into ‘intimate animal electricity’ had been supplanted 
(even though influencing) by the work of Alessandro Volta, which ultimately led 
to the invention of the first electric battery (and he called, in what he thought of 
as merely a sales or marketing metaphor, an ‘artificial electrical organ’). From 
this pragmatic invention/use of such discoveries his reputation was sealed and 
Galvani was left, it seemed, merely as an ancillary adjectival attachment to such 
processes as the ‘galvanic skin response’ and some key imagery for monstrous 
suturings of Shelley’s ‘Frankenstein: or, the Modern Prometheus’ (“Perhaps a 
corpse would be re-animated; galvanism had given token of such things: 
perhaps the component parts of a creature might be manufactured, brought 
together, and endued with vital warmth.” from Shelley’s introduction to 
Frankenstein). This has lately however come to be reassessed and it seems that 
Volta might have shied away somewhat from the sheer naturalism or intimacy of 
an electricity operating intrinsically within the very interior “economy of the 
animal” that Galvani was much more willing to embrace. In an analogous dualistic 
relation to the theologically shielding necessity of the Cartesian ‘pineal gland’, 
Volta just could not see how electricity could be so unfied. He was sure of a split 
or division between the external excitation and then what subsequently comes to 
be excited from an electrified outside: however responsive to electricity the 
natural body might be, it cannot itself be composed or worked by such a thing. 
Where he saw only a sort of bridgeable gap, Galvani saw a very intimate 
paleoprosthesis. Now, of course, the workings of such nerve cells (or “minute 
leyden jars”) have been shown to be bioelectrical or electrophysiological, just as 
Galvani had theorized, but which was overshadowed, or insulated safely, for a 
time by Volta’s more externalist (and his pragmatic external, seemingly merely 
metaphorically-prosthetic, constructions). It is interesting, no doubt, to see here 
how the workings or the symptoms of the politics of the time (just as with the 
difficulty of the Copernican wound) come to interfere with the reading of such 
electrical contacts (for more on this somewhat slow working-through see Piccolino 
1997). x	  For we say ‘expanse’ here to mark the illimitable archiving opportunities that are 
henceforth allowed for in such a recognition. As something that is no longer ‘local’ 
or proper only to itself or its surrounds, the uses it can be put to no longer bear 
upon themselves the traces of a restricted outer locality. In the slipstream 
opened up by this galvanian wound we will no longer then perhaps think of the 
inside as opening up onto another outside that is a sort of intimate inside 
(though, importantly, certain borders, as we will see, are still symbolically locked-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in-place; to assure the proper functioning and outer circulation of what the skin 
transmits: for the family-circle is what would still maintain the proper routing or 
circulations of such an economy, Oikos or housing) but to an outside that cannot 
any longer be given any shapely architectonic boundaries. As such a spatial-
temporal open, or expanse, the inside and its now opened databasing 
possibilities can be put toward a veritable infinity of uses far beyond those 
imagined by any intentional agency who would bear responsibility for what goes 
on inside itself. Like the location of a gravestone or of a crypt, the vestments of 
the inside might only be maintained, like the grave itself, as long as there are 
local memories enough to be assured of its deposits (the grave classically only 
exists for very few generations and then becomes an open or faceless resource). 
In truth the nodal-point that is the symbolic strength of the grave or the crypt no 
longer protects a singular body-of-work (and non-localised concepts such as 
intertextuality, and other concepts of structuration, very much prepare the way 
for such a conceptuality of the recognition of the paradigm of the galvanic act). 
Henceforth the inside will not be marked-off by anything that an inside might 
wish to hold or fold within itself (to idiosyncratically en-crypt). As filled with the 
pathos of the-loss-of-property, as this might sound or sound the death-knell for, 
we mean to say that the use-values of such a dehiscent galvanian space becomes 
nothing itself but an infinitely useful and expansive nodal-point contained within 
the dimensions of another expanse that itself is possibly infinite. This is the now 
non-localised wound that now no longer can be localised. Again, we would see the 
language of the reaction/response opposition as feeding or resourcing the reading 
of such a matrix: webs, hives, waypoints, expanses. This is not a sharp-left sea-
change so much as a re-focusing, or better rack-focusing, of something already 
repressed within previous institutional-representational formations. The wound is 
merely more clearly visible. xi	  See above note.	  
xii This is the strange celebratory-deploring apocalyptic image that Josh Harris, 
the 90’s Internet entrepreneur, likened the future of humanity to. As objects of 
the zoo (or of the zoographic gaze) he believes that we will most certainly super-
lose our privacy and that we will, in the future, very much “live in public”. As 
experimental-pro-pragmatic proof of this prediction he created two famous New 
York public/private happenings that rolled Big Brother into some predictive, pre-
dative facebook experiments. In his first social experiment “We Live in Public” he 
created a closed-in beehive styled pod (or coffin?) hotel where all ‘exhibiting’ 
members would be able to look at and interact with each other 24/7 for an 
extended period of time (until it was shutdown by the police around a month in). 
Every pod was networked together via cable-cctv and from time-to-time 
members were taken out and interrogated by Stasi-imitating overseers who 
would work to reduce further inhabitants’ sense of self (again playing into the 
notion of the Goffman’s total institution discussed in note ** above). In an 
interview to introduce his conceptual-concept-artifice to the world he stated 
“Everything is free here, except the videotape. That we own” to underline the dis-
ownership of personal space that each inhabitant would be giving up or 
exchanging for this regulated freedom of consumption and movement. He then 
went on to conduct another experiment of opened-pod-privacy (“Quiet: We Live 
in Public”) where cameras in every area of his apartment (including, somewhat 
imaginatively, the toilet bowl!) could observe and interact via a chatroom with his 
and his partner’s every movement within their flat-cage (on one occasion she 
slept on the couch after an argument on the advice and interaction of an 
anonymous Internet chatroom member). Such a selfless image of the worker-bee 
again raises its powerful metaphoric (lack of) visage, just as it so powerfully does 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
also, as Derrida points out, as a pivotal image within Heidegger’s zoo-graphic 
chamber in ‘Basic Problems in Phenomenology’. Equally in Uexküll’s influential 
essay ‘A Stroll Through The World of Animals and Men’ (not least for Heidegger, 
who wrote at some considerable appreciative length in this ‘Problems’ book about 
the then currently live umwelt researches of Uexküll) talks about the poverty of 
animals in comparison to man’s richness of world and particularly, and 
paradigmatically, of the trapped tick that reacts mechanically to the butyric acid 
secreted by a passing cow or mammal. This trapped poverty is the umwelt that 
we must understand that surrounds the animal as of a soap bubble (Uexküll 
provides some impressively communicative examples that hide, while certainly 
not trapping, an impressive conceptual complexity). In truth, he points out, we 
occupy umwelts too, but our “own” umwelt is a very open and shapeable sort of 
bubble. Such restrictive imagery of the bee and the beehive residence that 
encompasses and would threaten the rich human relation to ‘the open’ is also 
memorably (and in predictive eschatological intones) captured by E.M. Forster in 
his short story ‘The Machine Stops’ where people no longer travel or embark on 
journeys into the open, but stay in their pods and see, but not touch, everything 
(including their intimate geo-distant relatives) from a distance. Nobody, apart of 
course from the few, see within this machine, which will eventually stop, anything 
really to worry, agitate or campaign about (for of course actual travel makes you 
dirty in all senses) as nobody here realises their entrapped, and now merely 
reactive, poverty of being (and how very machinic-beelike they have become). 
Unsurprisingly some see this now as an early C20 short story based on a future 
vision of some captivating zoographic web 2.0 Internet-machinery. The pieces 
however were already in place and captured by quite a number of stories and 
inventions that the Internet is merely an extended family member of (though, of 
course, like the ancient Greek steam engine they had yet to find their epistemic 
local prowess) such as the Victorian Internet or the age of tele-technologies such 
as the telegraph, telephone and pneumatic tubes (later visualised so cleverly in 
Gilliam’s ‘Brazil’) and, of course, later Vannevar Bush’s ‘Memex’ machine. Further 
into the dark land of the repellant imagery of the reactive human-insect there is 
the image of the crowd where the individual-responsibility of the face disappears, 
no longer to stand out as a figure from a ground. Here we find the ‘The Day of 
the Locust’, where a swarm of insectuous quasi-telepathic mood-enraptured de-
individuals mechanically play-out a reaction programmed in by some powerful 
event that overruns them. A pre-crowdal responsibility thus hemorrhages out 
from holdings the body-proper and thus gets itself lost within the faceless 
dimensions of the labyrinthine cityscape. An interesting anthology titled ‘Crowds’ 
(edited by Jeffrey Schnapp) explores many such images of the crowd (and its 
cityscape).  
xiii For we will ask later whether the desire for penetration that operates through 
the desireful imagined machines that we will see as exemplifying the panop-tech-
clair-voyant “alter-spatial-gaze” do not wish to cut out the undecidablity of the 
face itself and all that it stands for. What we would here call inter-faciality (dually 
echoing both Levinas’s concept of the face-of-the-other and the traditional idea of 
the techné of the prosthetic interface) would wish to cut out or deface the 
undecidable site of the face itself. For ‘The Face’ is what presents the theatre of 
the interior to the exterior and which not only offers the possibility and hope of a 
means of clear access or denial through certain non-verbal cues (forming a 
notionally simultaneous visible-invisible curtain), but also the haunting counter-
veiling-possibility of the secret and its secretion (entombing a truth denied to a 
particular outside that would desire or demand rightful access) that might fail to 
betray a notional intentionality. The face then simultaneously occupies the 
position of both friend and enemy to the notional interlocutor and so as an ‘inter’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
or between site, there is always the risk as well as the reward. The face presents 
an undecidable Pharmakon. Something must come in to secure a passage 
through this possible deformation-of-the-surface. The site of ‘the face’ and the 
possibly thorny intercourse that it provides can best be captured by other means 
of a notionally hypo-dermic-interlocution. As site of preference, or of clear 
reference, the clear and present reward of the truth (in all of its desired pre-facial 
nakedness) and of the possibility of the secret of a secretion is what interlocution 
is after (but would also wish to come before, in all senses). The bypassing of the 
possibly blocked road of the face, through interfacing with the bio-electrical 
galvanic apparatus, would assure and, as we said, cut out the necessity of the 
troubling facial intercourse. This possibility of a matrix of the extra-facial, as we 
will see later, is what umbilically feeds and keeps going our main panop-tech-
clair-voyant exemplar Prof. Kevin Warwick’s quest and here we will only find the 
working of a most strange paradox, a little further into our argument, when inter-
facial or sexual intercourse itself becomes a sort of secondary supplement for 
something other or else. The face would thus be lifted out of the picture and 
panop-tech-clair-voyant apparatuses brought down as of an ultra-clear-
penetrative-visor; clearing out the thickety problematic-of-the-undecidable that 
any inter-facial intercourse (and other supposedly intercourses lacking immediacy 
by extension) would maintain. On this view (for we are certainly not forwarding 
this simultaneous pessimistic-optimistic position as our own, but for more 
complex reasons, that we hope will later become more clear, or even clair, later) 
responsibility would, in such a bypassing of the undecidablity of the face, be 
replaced by a beautifully and purely reactive machinic cybernetic loop. Nothing 
would, any longer, fall toward the tomb-of-uncertainty through such an 
impenetrably thick fogging of the face. Reaction not responsibility. 
xiv So many social networking ideals exhibit images of hyper-consciously 
empowered ‘smart mobs’ (for here we are not dealing with the pessimism 
attached to that irresponsible entity that we call ‘the crowd’) who come together 
to see their interests through before dispersing to other interests and other 
responsibilities. On this view, as tea party activists they network together, not 
with the aim of losing their identity within the confines of some labyrinthine 
mass, morass, crowd or hive, but of temporarily and temperately coming 
together, within temporary agoras of some quite shapeable plasticity (we could 
indeed term these ‘plast-agoras’), so that the imposition of a framework does not 
win (and thus make them reactive machines to something imposed from 
“Washington” or somewhere even less present that is distantly centralising). 
Within this particular and progressive portrait of such a model or paragon of 
selflessness, the situated self joins likeminded selfs to help out a cause that is 
heartfelt. If this were not enough, and as added evidence of this securing of their 
self’s security, they would point out the sheer overlap yet disparity  of group 
identities (venn-dentities) within their facebook pages. They are not, on this 
view, zoologically confined to a bubble, but are self-less in a very self-full way. 
Networking here makes contacts and stretches the self’s bubble into the most 
diverse and expanded of territories: the riches and the possibilities of 
replenishing the stocks and shares of the responsible unwelt thus increase and 
here again we find some powerful and potent post-human imagery at play, or on 
the prowl? For we will see (in section ** with J.P. Barlow and R. Kurzweill) that 
there is a clear, and really not very paradoxical side, to such post-humanism that 
sees an bounteous-everlasting increasing of the human within its very 
simultaneous overcoming or posting. 
xv Animal reaction is a self-less poverty-of-world in opposition to the human’s 
world-forming vision. While coming from a lecture course of Heidegger’s, this is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
also almost a straight quotation of Jacob Von Uexküll’s (although original dates 
actually might point towards a reciprocal working back in of Heidegger into 
Uexküll’s: Heidegger’s ‘Problems’ lecture series were delivered in the academic 
year 1928-29, while Uexküll’s ‘Stroll’, which aimed to make palpably-public his 
work, is dated around 1933). Further evidence of Uexküll’s influence upon a 
1920s German strain of phenomenologically inclined (or more properly here Neo-
Kantian in this case) philosophy at the time comes in the shape of Ernst Cassirer 
who headed the University of Hamburg where Uexküll set up his Institute for 
Umweltforschung and who probably also introduced Heidegger to his work 
(Heidegger attended a lecture of Cassirer’s at Davos-Switzerland where Uexküll’s 
current umwelt researches formed part of the subject matter). Cassirer writing in 
his ‘Essay on Man’ stated, “There is an unmistakable difference between the 
organic reactions and human responses” (p.29, my emphasis). Again we have 
reaction and response and an abyssal space wedged in-between them. To 
augment and to clarify this distinction of the human agency Cassirer adds an 
extra symbolic layer for the human, which comes or intervenes between Uexküll’s 
terminological poles of the Merknetze (receptor net) and the Werknetze (effector 
net) that the animal also possesses. Man is not just set apart as the Aristotelian 
animal rationale, but according to Cassirer also the highly distinguished animal 
symbolicum. The animal is clearly and cleanly denied access to the symbol. 
Similarly, Merleau-Ponty (‘Nature’) in appreciably addressing Uexküll’s non-
mechanistic externalist approach to the animal, however likens certain categories 
of animal to what he calls ‘animal machines’ or non-institutional (as in lacking in 
the locality of a certain portion of plasticity or ‘choice’) ‘reflex republics’ where 
organs rule the organism instead of vice versa. While allowing for more 
variegation within the animal domain(s) he erects a machinic comparison that 
sets the human at a summit of an a-machinic positionality. Merleau-Ponty does 
however simultaneously open up a space of temporal-based reactivity within 
more ‘complex’ bio-entities in his interpretation of Uexküll: “The Merkzeit, for 
Uexküll, is not a fact of consciousness, but a component of the physical structure, 
which is manifest in the behaviour of the animal” (Nature, p.173). 
xvi Of course Derrida denied that such word-concepts could be taken out of their 
highly delimited operating environments (the particular texts being deconstructed 
through the capture of a uneasy term, extracted from the texts themselves). 
There is however, no doubt, a network-effect that arises from their variously 
positioned similarity of undecidability within each of their locales. 
xvii To jump ahead a little, to give a sense of a roadmap toward a destination, we 
will offer towards the end the word/concept of an ineradicable, incurable and 
absolutely irreducible distérrance that, not only comes between or intervenes 
irreducibly upon the actions of two or more communicative parties as an inter-
distérrance, but also equally irreducibly within any single party as an intra-
distérrance. Our key term (for the conclusion of our argument) “Distérrance” is 
a composite of three irreducible “difficulties”: distance, différance and 
errant/errancy. Though clearly related in terms of their concentration on 
unbridgeable ‘gaps’ these three contain fissures that we would wish to have stay 
exposed and un-sutured. Firstly there is a Levinasian aspect of distance (as in 
the autrui or infinity of the other) but which we would wish here to drain of its 
autrui privileging by adding, stitching or compositing also Derridean différance 
that would take away this alter-privilege (without retracing steps back to a 
privilege of the singular subject) while still keeping the notion of a splitting 
involving notional subjectivities (différance alone does not contain the notion of 
inter-faciality or of sub-jects). Thirdly we would add to this Levinasian-Derridean 
split-containment a third notion of irreducible errancy that draws attention to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
certain Foucauldian will-to-power-knowledge that always finds itself contending or 
grappling with what would be errant. This errancy is irreducible and always in a 
process of becoming and is the very condition of possibility of the knowledge that 
would bring it into line. This errancy again is not (soley) the errancy of any 
particular possibly errant empirical party (a spouse or, as we will see, a Hegelian 
“blood friend”) whose errancy would be fought against through the erection of 
such prosthetic panop-tech-clair-voyant mechanisms to contain such errant 
mis/behaviour, but is (very importantly for the conclusion of our argument) 
contained within the very “intra” of the passageways of the subject in 
themselves (self as already distant; already différance; already errant –hence the 
need to provide a portmanteau word of these three irreducibles). Any panop-
tech-clair-voyant “viewing screen” that one might, as we will see, wish to erect 
inside the previously protected force-field of the face of the other (to screen their 
behaviour) is not only about an errancy to look out for that is geometrically 
placed over there, but also an errancy in the very interiority of the self itself that 
cannot itself be brought under any control, itself. Such an originary arche-intra-
errancy, as we will see, prevents the subject from occupying any secured or 
firewalled position of self-ownership before they would wish to construct any 
bridging act of ontic communication that would then prevent the errancy so 
worried-over in the other (the evidence of the very wish that Warick exhibits in 
wishing to construct this family-encircling prosthetic mechanism). As a split-
nexus of three terms then distérrance is the very material support that will 
prevent the closure of a pre-distérrant  panop-tech-clair-en-voyance. 
xviii Obviously we are (that is my-self here and now, in depositing this trace) 
somewhat cynically placed before this title of self-less-ness. Self-other. 
xix This latter apocalyptic hyperbole is, of course deplored (and adored by those 
who manage to simultaneously or implosively celebrate-deplore) in the works of 
Baudrillard and Virilio. Loss, implosion, gone and biblically profound these 
writings intone in the tone of street occupying sandwich board walkers who we in 
ignorance walk by and make room for. There is a nascent eroticism within these 
intonations that captivate in a similar way to McLuhan in the 60s/70s where 
media “theory” takes an emotive turn and becomes sexy within the very spaces 
that it trains its own optics on. The irony is not lost upon either party and a 
strange beelike dance of the hunter and the hunted ensues where each does not 
quite know which role the other is playing, as their roles (as both also notice) 
have imploded. 
xx This before then should be heard in two senses, just as in Derrida’s ‘Before the 
Law’.  We would perhaps wish to see ourselves as responsible ‘before’ these 
technologies and before these technologies came along (either to add or take 
away; deposit or de-position), but also as responsible before reaction and before 
what is mechanical and prosthetic. The before then is not temporal or spatial (as 
one appears before some-time or some-space, e.g. ‘The Law’, in all our 
responsibility) but an inmixing of both and neither. Once we are before; once we 
were before; once we’re here before; once we’re there before: responsible or 
reactive; self-ful or self-less? The purpose of this paper then is not to mediate 
between these positions in favour of a new law, but of problematising any 
responsibility before such prostheses. The prosthesis, in being an already-
electrical, might not be so promised or threatened and might not be so whole. 
Here we would agree with Martin Hägglund’s reading of Derrida in the face of 
certain religious or ethical attempts at recuperation. He points out in ‘Radical 
Atheism’ that certain Levinas inspired readings of Derrida (Critchley, Beardworth, 
Cornell) wish to find an infinity in Derrida that we would read as bringing back a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
certain Christian responsibility and thus humanism. While we are not suggesting 
our own radical-reaction (for Hägglund’s radical atheism) again such a 
recuperation of responsibility (by Haraway), we would draw attention to the 
working of the iterable (in relation to the Austinian performative) that Derrida 
talks about so extensively in his reply to Searle in Limited Inc. 
xxi We will ask, as can be imagined, what in fact a cyborg is and how one can use 
the somewhat questionable barrier the skin as the figural border of use of 
technology from technology becoming a newly integrated organ. Technological 
resources have been used ‘since the beginning’ as means of communication or 
expansion of the present horizon (the French archaeologist Andre Leroi-Gourhan 
pointed out some time ago the primal-originary nature of the hominid’s integral 
relation to technology –via the hand’s very shape- that questions any idea of an 
early innocence prior to a technological encroachment). Subcutaneous invasions 
and upgrades to the human skeleton partake in fact of a romantic image of a 
whole-being whose whole comes later to be invaded. Leroi-Gourhan points out 
that this invasion is hardly late coming but was always already underway. 
xxii John Perry Barlow is a retired cattle rancher who takes much of the imagery of 
the both the wild untamed west and the individualistic east coast 
transcendentalist Thoreueanism and transposes it or updates it across to the free 
space of cyberspace…. 
xxiii Henry David Thoreau is famous for his meditating upon his wish-to-withdraw 
from the encroachments of technocratic-democratic modernity, written about in 
his book ‘Walden’. Like his much later fellow-traveler J.P. Barlow, H.D. Thoreau 
sought out the solid ground of an independence from the constraints that he saw 
presently being erected all around him, in his time. Modeled upon the idea(l) of a 
self that is already secure Thoreau’s declaration-of-personal-security is very much 
paradoxically a shared ideological plank or component of the very vessel of 
modernity that he saw himself as struggling against being forced to be a part of 
(albeit a differing enough wing of such a vessel) the currency-of-money and all 
that it captivates of the self (making of it simply an element-of-exchange). A 
independent good life is thus sought within the location of Walden where the only 
support for his own figure is the ground of his very own figure. He will support 
and only be supported only by himself.  
xxiv  
xxv Embalmed|Unembalmed: Problems of the Lived Event in Media Studies 2.0’ 
xxvi Similarly we would argue against (as would Derrida) any McLuhan-esque 
notion of a internetworked global village where everybody is brought together 
upon some de-territorialised ground. The realization of such a groundless ground 
pre-supposes a teleological concept of communication that would re-establish the 
connections (at last) that writing some time ago put asunder and divorced us 
from. Prior to this the oral-based community of village life allowed for an 
immediacy that writing later would place its deferring/differing delay circuits into 
and between. The story of such mediations has apparently here been also the 
story also of a simultaneous dispersion but re-gathering. At the end of the 
dispersed journey a secondary-writing (the poison) would also provide a 
secondary-orality (the cure) that will bring us back together through the very 
means that originally separated us off from the immediacy of a unified social 
body. In a book titled ‘Digital McLuhan’ Levinson sees a vindication of McLuhan’s 
global village that sadly McLuhan himself (as ‘Digital Moses’ to this idea) did 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
himself not get to experience or reside upon. The Internet brings us together 
upon an expansive land that at longlast is no longer divided or celled-up. 
xxvii My uneasy inverted commas, but not in a moral sense. Again the distinction 
(as in Heidegger’s between organic organ and secondary equipment) is pre-
supposed within the act that would see a future replacement of the entirety of the 
organs by new permanent technological (and thus not liable to decrepitude) 
organs. Is the distinction that Heidegger is eager to make between organs and 
equipment, not also presupposed in Kurzweill’s innocent idea of downloadings 
and replacements? It is true, to be sure, that Heidegger and Kurzweill come from 
two radically differing traditions (with the latter operating, in what Heidegger 
would see as Cartesian inspired technologically enframed world-picture), but both 
see something of the pre-prosthetic (paradoxical, to investigate further?) in the 
saveablity, presence or substantiality of something inside (and it could easily be 
argued that Kurzweill clings onto this in a much stronger fashion than does 
Heidegger who has a rather more ambivalent relationship between technicity and 
a soul-substance opposite). Kurzweill celebrates the machine and the picture but 
cannot let go of the idea of the self that such a machinery should store or 
animatedly archive. 
xxviii Although Fukuyama wrote about the end of history, he has questions about 
extending life into some near infinite. See ‘Out Posthuman Future’ 
xxix ‘The Singularity is Near’ (a title surely armed for television) and ‘The Age of 
Spiritual Machines’ are both very quantitatively-inclined books. Moore’s Law (of 
exponential computer speed increases) assure us of a time that is close on the 
horizon. Similarly Kevin Warwick tells the BBC website of the soon to occur 
takeover of the world by computer intelligence (which, as children watching for 
the monstrous, we should be watchful over) and how very close this is. Sarcastic 
as this note is toward such a conception, neither of these futurologists seem to 
need to consult any “authorities” within the departments of philosophy of mind. 
Kurzweill is aware of one such cynical philosopher (the militant Heideggerian 
scholar Dreyfus and his books about “What Computers Cannot Do” and “What 
Computers (Still) Cannot Do” which point out how the most seemingly basic of 
human comportments, based upon tacit, quite ‘fuzzy’ knowledge, cannot be 
downloaded into a Minskian robots, etc.) he calls a sort of spoil-sport. No 
counter-argument is needed, only a pointing out of speed increases and the 
continued embeddedness of the computer within our lives. This ‘within’ however 
should be conceptualized in very careful and variegated ways. 
xxx Dvorksy obviously coins this term in the early 21st century to show the 
technological culmination or supplementation of something altogether more 
occultist. The term that Dvorsky uses (techlepathy) plays on a term which itself 
was coined within an age of technological transformation. Addressing his 
colleagues of the London ‘Society for Psychical Research’ (an institution which he 
cofounded) Frederic Myers stated “we venture to introduce the words Telesthesia 
and Telepathy to cover all the cases of impression received at a distance without 
the normal operation of the recognised sense organs”. Myers introduced this term 
(just as Dvorsky does later, in a more neologistic-parasitical fashion) to replace 
‘thought-transference’ to precisely add the transfer of something ‘aesthetic’ or the 
receiving of impressions at a distance, while also partaking of the explosion of 
various tele-media (as Royle points out) that were promising tele-communication 
at the time. While the transfer of thought-at-a-distance offers the opportunity of 
something akin to the sharing of a purity of meaning, telepathy takes us closer to 
‘the’ site occupied by whatever impresses the notional sender in the first place. 
This impression is, as we will see below in Dvorsky’s own usage, something that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
would take us more proximate to the meaning-to-say that would first fire-off the 
meaning and the thoughts (which are secondary to the primacy of the 
impression). Here again then we find sympathy or empathy instead of a mere 
understanding of the other (albeit at some distance) and thus something much 
more hyperbolic than the transfer of a mere thought. 
xxxi This is dressed-up within the rhetorical garb of the futurist visionary who, as is 
so often the case, is someone who picks up on the invention of something that, 
innovative in itself, will have further revolutionary unforeseen “uses”. While this 
ontic innovation becomes tomorrow’s (Silicon Valley) fish and (silicon) chip 
wrapping, Dvorsky sees semi-buried within this resource a revolutionary 
ontological way of finally unwrapping the self and opening it up to technological 
openness in all senses…  
xxxii It is this proximal spatial closer that so captivates Dvorsky’s attention within 
this local ontical invention of Chuck Jorgensen’s. It resonates with something he 
has been thinking for a long time. For here he sees the intending-to-say as a site 
and a place that can be siphoned-off and directed to technologies that, as we will 
soon see, allow for two parties to be brought closer (and this closer is not simply 
some quantitative increase within a sphere that is some mere metaphorical 
spatial proximity, but a veritable qualitative transformation: a singularity) to the 
spirit that desires the ultimativity of union: coliloquy (i.e. colloquy+soliloquy=n). 
Here we are obviously thinking of Derrida’s early study of Husserl in ‘Speech and 
Phenomena’ (some translate the title as ‘Voice and Phenomena’) where Derrida 
discusses Husserl’s attempts to divide a supposedly internal ‘expressive’ sign 
from an external and public ‘indicative’ sign. The supposedly singular expressive 
(soliloquy) sign however cannot clear itself of its divisive ‘indicative other’ and 
Husserl’s whole phenomenological exploration of the intimacy of the self finds 
itself surrounded on all sides, and within all its hoped-for sovereign dimensions, 
by what is outside (and now inside-outside). It is this hidden-hauntedness, as 
with (mis)appropriations from many other deconstructive source readings, which 
Derrida will use more openly himself as ‘différance’. Dvorsky, as with Kurzweil 
and soon with Prof. Warwick, would wish to ignore such an intimately divisive 
dehiscent différance.  For Dvorsky (and soon Warwick) presupposes an 
unquestionable presence of ‘the intimate’; an intimacy-of-presence that we will 
soon be able to break off and share with our significant other: an intimacy that 
will transcend our, presently conventional, poorly expressive indicative 
conversational signage. Once then we can siphon this site of the meaning-to-say, 
our loved one will come to see exactly what we mean. Derrida (or rather Husserl 
in his own marginalizing folds) points out however that here there is no pure 
thought (signified outside of signifiers; soliloquy outside of colloquy) to purely 
“thought-transfer”. 
xxxiii Again we would refer to this desire to isolate some purity of signal that, just 
as with the complexities of moving robots along xyz coordinates involving 
“obstacles”, would allow access to some expressive ‘desire-point’ as a journey 
that is not only problematic at the notional point of arrival (communication with 
the interiority of the commicatee) but at the very point of departure itself (the 
commicator being able to be within their own proximity). 
xxxiv As well as with Aristotle, entelechy was used as a term in the biological 
sciences and was introduced in the by the German 19th/20th century biologist 
Hans Driesch. Having similar qualms to Uexküll a few years later with his umwelt 
researches, Dreisch did not agree with the mechanistic externalist Darwinian 
views of the biological organism that were currently coming to dominate the 
biological sciences. Contra to these externalist models he pointed to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
entelechial motion of the organism towards its goal, etc. He also, interestingly for 
our purposes, happened to believe in the existence of telepathy. We will try to 
draw together some of these seemingly disparate strings later in our argument. 
xxxv It is quite funny when he reaches the point where he visualizes the location of 
the new upstream interface, that although there is a location for the existing 
prosthesis developed by NASA that the newer more deeper-burrowing apparatus 
is not really explained very well. He simply says, this simple next-step will involve 
the delivery of “a fancy neural data conversion device”. Such a simple device 
really is for others to worry about, for there will be really nothing to it. 
xxxvi Because obviously this wish to erase the voco from the apparatus will not 
displace (in any Derridean general writing) the phonocentric but will, on the 
contrary, solidify its rule, its supposed archy. For the meaning-to-say is all the 
more deemed to be a location or coordinate, whose provenance and domain will 
be proven and expanded, on this view, on a higher, grander scale. 
xxxvii For in cutting out this deferred externalization that is the vocal apparatus, 
and placing an electric-prosthetic closer (if not at the very location) of the 
meaning-to-say, we find something analogous in its desire to Husserl’s expressive 
as opposed to indicative sign that we discussed a few footnotes ago. 
xxxviii As we will see below with Dvorsky’s fellow traveler Warwick, the bypassing 
of the previously held dominion of such an ‘accoustic realm’ does not itself equate 
to an ending of the sovereign rule and dominion of the ‘phonocentric realm’, for 
this post-human and trans-humanist domain still very much carries with it the 
rule and regulation (not to say also the role) of the humanist spirit of the 
intentionalist locale. Here we find a very important irony within the use of such 
supposedly transformative prefixes as ‘trans’ and ‘post’, as this extension and 
prosthesis that Dvorsky proposes to call techlepathy and that Dvorsky sees so 
much expansive-explosive-exposive potential in, seeks only to extend and 
prosthetise the dominion of something still very very still-humanist. Arché, rule 
and a localist-personalist dominion here would very much be extended rather 
than transcended all that the acoustic-ideological realm carries with it. Here we 
can only refer him across to Derrida’s seminal study ‘Of Grammatology’, as well 
as the justly celebrated essay ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ (in ‘Dissemination’) and ‘Speech 
and Phenomena’ that we discussed above, for some useful clarification on some 
of these phonetic-accoustic-gordian knots. xxxix	  We will talk below about this prosthetic or technological supplementation of 
an occult sense or desire. While we would like to quote longer this very 
interesting passage that indeed exposes and uncovers a certain encompassing 
immediatist desire within communications and their draw/promise this could 
easily break the flow of the argument. He goes on to state however that this 
timeless reaching toward telepathy (and now arriving through techlepathy) 
through the finally cleansing checkpoints and arrival-points (into this so long 
promised land) of many current post-industrial technologies. In a section 
immediately following the above, and within an obviously McLuhanesque  
sounding section titled ‘The Shrinking Planet’ (and it is worth quoting at length for 
the conveyance of a tone that is hyperbolically exalted and excited in its 
reportage-from-the-front-line, from one so intimately concerned with the 
possibilities of immediation) he states: 
 “Our civilization’s current postindustrial phase has often been referred to, 
 quite rightly, as the Information Age. Moreover, the speed at which 
 information is processed and exchanged is only getting faster. There’s no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 question that humanity’s collective clock-speed is steadily increasing. 
 Indeed, as is Moore’s Law, the communications revolution is still in effect 
 and showing no signs of abating. Thanks to the rapid-fire nature provided 
 by such things as email correspondence and instant messaging, 
 conversations that used to take weeks or days now only take hours or 
 minutes. In fact, as I recently read an archived exchange between Charles 
 Darwin and his rival Louis Agassiz from the 19th Century, I realized that 
 the entire exchange must have taken months if not years since their 
 letters had to cross the Atlantic by boat. (Darwin lived in England while 
 Agassiz was in the US.) Today when scientists converse, they debate, 
 critique and collaborate at breakneck speed. What’s interesting isn’t 
just  the types of communication tools that now exist. It’s also 
the way in which  people use them—ways that hint at a desire for 
more intimate and open  forms of communication [my emphasis]. 
Sitting at a red light the other day, I noticed a herd of pedestrians crossing 
the street—each and every one of them with a cell phone held tightly 
against their ear [one has to admire here the somewhat comical haughty 
cod-anthropological tone and again note the animalist-reactive-ganged 
metaphor of ‘the crowd’ that the anthropological one takes their distance 
from]. These days, information transfer between people is nearly 
instantaneous, regardless of what they’re doing and where they are. Many 
people are also tapping into the power of  instant messaging. Programs 
such as Messenger, ICQ and GAIM are immensely popular, changing the 
way in which people interact altogether. Family members converse with 
each other while in the same house (calling the kids down for dinner will 
never be the same again). Parents  chat with their kids while at work. 
Coworkers, whether they’re in the same building or offsite, can quickly 
exchange information and work in  collaborative ways. Social networking 
programs, such as Friendster, Tribe and Orkut, are also contributing to 
novel forms of communication. These programs are undoubtedly making 
the world a smaller place by steadily decreasing the number of so-called 
degrees of separation that exist between people. I’m continually stunned 
at the efficiency of how this  works. I have only 19 immediate friends in 
my Friendster network, but it explodes out from there to 1,010 second-
degree friends and 50,611 third- degree friends. I’m pretty much 
convinced that if you’re on the Internet there’s no less than four degrees 
of separation between you and anyone else on the Web, which is two 
complete degrees below the conventional  six degrees of separation that is 
thought to exist for all people…” (Dvorsky, ibid) 
We are in the presence then of somebody who can interpolationally-extrapolate 
from such increasing degrees of immediacy (itself a notion we obviously question, 
again even of a self-intimacy, before such a reduction in numerical degrees) to a 
position of clear-immediacy once these desires are properly harnessed and given 
their goal. What is certainly worth agreeing with Dvorsky on, whatever 
disagreements in the reading one might make of these teletechnologies, is of the 
desire and its movements (if not the unitary achievement of the goal) for-the-
sake-of immediation within many current ontic networking technologies such as 
those described by Dvorsky, so knowingly and techno-shamanlike, above. What 
Dvorsky fails to grasp (in describing the communications detail and topography of 
this post-industrial age) is a certain displacement of the arché that he 
nevertheless would wish to cling onto. This is the very double-edge that, in 
wishing to forego, only creeps on back through the back-door like some 
irremediable weed or self-multiplying virus. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
xl For as we will see, speech at present provides too much colloquy, and 
ultimately telepathy should furnish a sort of join-soliloquy.  
xli I say ‘practical’ for, as with Kurzweill, the creation of such practical ground-
floor prostheses is embedded within a larger more globalizing project that far 
outstrips the reach of these prostheses and lands us within territories that are. In 
his autobiography (or should we say auto-cyoborg-ography) ‘I, Cyborg’ Warwick 
talks of a time where our children’s children will “look back with wonder at how 
their ancestors could have been so primitive as to communicate by means of 
silly little noises called speech”. When one examines what Warwick 
understands by speech, we find however something quite linguistically primitive 
and that he is working within a model of communication which does not seem to 
feel the need to visit any theoretical debates on communication. Indeeed while 
the bibliography within this book has some interesting entries (Dreyfus, Haraway, 
Hayles, Fukuyama, Penrose), none of these are referred to within the main body. 
In a similar fashion Kurzweill (who Warwick received a supportive email from 
when some critics were wondering about his sales-patter when playing with his 
embedded prostheses), sees philosophers of mind, language, technics, etc. as 
just so many spoil-sports. Minsky had a similar approach at MIT in the 70’s but 
then was forced to reevaluate his use of Cartesian coordinates as quantitative 
data within the buildings of robotics. Philosophers of embodiment had been 
saying for some time that getting around was not merely a case of following 
some xyz mapping agenda but is based more around tacit knowledge and 
complex background processes. Although fuzzy-logics have begun to broach this 
post-quantitative approach, still notions of clean ‘information’ tend to override 
any possibly opposing ‘logic’. Indeed Warwick is very excited by error-diminution 
and seems somewhat to be caught in the wonderments of the infinitely plastic 
50s in his model of sci-fi futurity. The future is simply about ‘less errors’. 
xlii And are these differences of buildings so different. We are not so much talking 
about the now-famous stretching of work into the home and the breaking of the 
border that upsets the work and homelife balance as a… 
xliii It would, of course, be interesting to map the coordinates of this physicalist 
folding out of the selfspace’s body-space into the otherspace’s embodied-space 
that would match this more psychical ‘panopt-tech-clair-voyant’ variety that we 
are attempting to map out here. By ‘chipping’ oneself to identify (and again fold-
out) in various ways to the outside, the coordinate of the skin, as self, comes into 
question (but again we would question a prior-skin deposition). We are, it is 
obvious, dealing with the commonality of the subject-object divide that will add 
some interesting (Merleau-Ponty?) questions of where things touch and where 
they end.	  
xliv He makes references to film, both in semiotic terms in the external design of 
the prostheses (“Borg Collective” Art Nouveau curves) and in also pointing out 
that his own inventions have proved influential within certain filmic 
representations (James Bond subcutaneous chip is embedded in exactly the same 
place, a place unnecessary in itself as a subcutaneous location, as his own). He is 
very much tied then to his technology as a user-inventor of the old C19 shed-
based/sideshow tradition. And also gains, of course, a certain ethical prestige, 
through not putting someone else through what he himself would also not go 
through. This provides a very overdeterined nexus of presences, just as he 
presents his inventions and his reinvented self. xlv	   We will soon be addressing issues of inter-face-iality and the paradoxical 
image of coming face-to-face with something that nevertheless presents the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
possibility of an external obstacle or barrier to admittance. Just as we might, in 
frustration, come to require, or perhaps demand, the teleological promise of 
some ‘face time’ to really get to grips with the very meaning-to-say that would 
transport us into a position of ‘immediacy’ (and Apple’s iPhone 4 ads present a 
tactile promise in their images of co-present de-mediated communication via 
their face-time protocols: the s/he character touches the other s/he via the 
screen as one sees the facial presented in a figuration of tele-present immediacy 
via tele-phone), so the face offers a double-edged Janus-faced problematic that 
we as communicators would wish to get beyond. Levinas (who we will later also 
question a little more deeply via the problematic of a super-valorized alterity that 
does nothing but repeat presence in the absence of a self-presence) opposes the 
saying to the said and offers up the sight/site of the former as the site of 
singular shared sincerity, just as the presence of the exteriorizing sight of the 
face-of-the-other places us in a position of some immediacy with the other as 
other: Other they may be but we still share an immediacy in the saying-act. The 
live-saying (as opposed to the dead-said) would place us infinitively closer to 
the infinity of the other that would also take us outside of a written relation of a 
will-to-totality (question: but will infinity clash with totality?). So any 
communication that could (and we must state this argument is not fuelled by a 
worry about the possible future-presence of such a panop-tech-clair-voyant 
apparatus, whose arrival would simultaneously be its own simultaneous-intimate 
failure) cut through the present transportation of a said (writing as the classical 
failed masturbatory marker of an en-crypted dead-said) and provide a 
transported saying (Apple’s ‘FaceTime’ as a fantasy marker of Warwick’s 
fantasized and more intimate immediatory apparatuses of a unemblamed-
saying) would supposedly present much more than the face alone allows (by its 
barrier-entrance). Here we find again a prosthetic apparatus that would extend a 
sense that, not only did not exist prior to the possibility of the erection of such 
techlepathic, or as would prefer to say ‘panop-tech-clair-en-voyant’ prostheses 
(for it was a figure of the occult that sucked imagery from newly arriving tele-
technological prosthetics (as we saw in an above footnote with Myers’ coining of 
metaphorically fuelled telepathy and telesthesia), but also which would use 
figures of sight and haptics (seeing and touching) but would wish to (in the very 
metaphoric using) bypass the external screens and reach right inside to the truth 
of what fuels the saying (a sort of proper-saying behind the saying). We will look 
later at some of Levinas’s paradoxical immediacies of the self’s chimeric 
connections with the saying-face of the other. For here Levinas might share some 
ground with his somewhat inflated notion of the trace (which is very different to 
Derrida’s). xlvi	  The temporal modality within the rhetoric that we mimic here within our usage 
of the word “awaits” is important because, as with Dvorsky above, Warwick 
paints a powerful picture of a future that was always already prepared for and 
awaiting us as a arche-parent from the very start of it all (presumably, the very 
first or primal prosthesis): a sort of future ‘on-rails’, like a date or a programmed-
in teleological-terminus station guaranteed from the very moment that one is 
aboard. Indeed before one is aboard. This then is a highly magnetic future-
anterior that is not, if set within an enveloping plasticity, accidentally stumbled 
upon within a sort of random Darwinian play, but which magnetically draws us 
near from the very departing extreme-of-distance of the very beginning. It is 
thus a very biblical-entelechial liveness that everything has been ganged in 
lockstep towards. Such an ongoing liveness of this future-anterior bespeaks 
within every singular empirical step along the way.  
 For every step is a small structural component of one very long song that 
all technologies and all their ‘inventors’ and all their ‘investors’ and all their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘investigators’ have all been singing, within one large historically disparate relay-
compilation or chorus, and which, after each have in-their-turn stepped up to and 
then stepped down from the same archiving microphone (withdrawing for the 
next and sharing some cross-over time), will all fade out trans-generationally 
together, like a song that has been sung across the many generations. This 
singularly long song might not, of course, have always been sung by many of its 
participants, for charity, but in the end it will even out and trickle down and we 
will all thence (ancestrally, at least) be the winners. It is very hard for a 
technology or any exponent, one can see, to escape from the orbiting of this 
songbook. 
xlvii For the very opening words of Warwick’s autocyborgography titled ‘I, Cyborg’ 
state: “I WAS BORN human” (uppercase in the original) within a somewhat 
traditionally pulp-fictional-functional retrospective-facing originary narrato-
novelistic tone. That the end of his life, is not the coextensive with the end of this 
book, as it itself (his own end) is of course itself currently unwritten (at the time 
of the depositing of the traces within the writing this paper). And yet, and of 
course, presumably the transformation into a cyborg, that could write or imprint 
such a line, harbours the safety of the harbour-of-a-future where a sentence such 
as “I DIED cyborg” will not be written and thus the bio-graphy itself becomes a 
difficulty of testament or testimony of any coming ultimate past tense (and by 
extension, of testimony and time). Although this line, “I WAS BORN human”, 
smells (if a cyborg can smell) or has the odor of a line of marketing-meditation 
(as well as an opening line of a salvo within a polemic against the protective 
shells of a technologically fearful pre-post-humanism), it nevertheless harbors a 
paradoxicality that Warwick is not sufficient “himself” broad enough to broach. 
xlviii See last paragraph of the last but one footnote, which we could mechanically 
duplicate here. 
xlix Although it is not available to me, a titillatingly titled 2001 documentary called 
‘Digital Sex’ has Warwick talking about being able to experience his wife’s 
pleasure and vice versa. While electrical implants are spoken about in the 
quotation below in terms of a direct brain-to-brain communication, this 
documentary takes a much more chemical approach where the presence of 
secretions of sexual hormones are passed along to the other and vice versa. The 
idea here is to complete a sexual-circuitry where again, as we will point out 
below, intercourse would itself presumably become its own absence. 
l Or ‘Singularity’ to use Kurzweill’s adopted “master” term. 
li This sentence may seem to exhibit a rather excessive or gratuitous amount of 
“intercourse” (!) that some might complain about, but we must un-gratuitously 
and strategically-structurally underline the internally riven nature of any 
immediationary intercourse and how fundamentally based upon différance it 
necessarily is. Any wish to surmount it inevitably would wish to cancel out the 
undecidability of intercourse, which would be the end of all intercourse itself. 
lii Touch is, of course, a metaphor that carries a lot of gravity or weight. As 
Derrida has pointed out (in ‘On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy) ‘touch’ often figures 
as the teleology of communication and acts therein as a sort of economic 
guarantor or gold-standard. “…I could almost touch it” can be attached to so 
many other apparatuses that it acts as a sort of master-prosthesis. This highly 
geo-metric figure (Berkeley himself saw sight as a becoming-touch sense and 
that the tactile quality of locating something is that something’s guarantee of 
what exactly it is. Add to later (imp. note for immediation idea) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
liii Intercourse: “speech” in the sense of Dvorsky, “sex” in the sense of Warwick. 
liv [The Intercourse of] Touch is here not listed as it is the supervisory authority-
sense (as in footnote..) that serves these other two (speech and sex). As the 
master-sense it would have these other two be able to reach-inside-the-other and 
find something singular that it can touch. Such is the whole that such touching 
presupposes and upon which the subject (as responsible agent) is pre-supposed, 
etc. (clean-up note, develop?) 
lv This is the model of writing that McLuhanesque models of mediation work 
within. Something more than simply a village, and something better than a 
reintegrated higher-scale talk? 
lvi As somebody pointed out to me in conversation at the Cardiff Zoontotechnics 
conference where I delivered this paper, the figure of technological/telepathy has 
changed somewhat since the  sc-fi images of 1950s/60s, from information 
transferral to something now much more ispeic and intimate and which this paper 
has been attempting to address  in a related sense. Perhaps this mutation within 
the figurology of the tele-pathology (from a wish for a teleological structure of 
pure information to a desire for pure orgasmic immanent-interiority) fits or locks 
in well with a recent turn to the affective and the emotive, which has been 
mapped by many scholars recently (and which docusoaps in television reflect on 
a more quotidian or everyday lived-level.  
lvii This was Jakob Von Uexküll’s term that sought to tackle the predomininant 
Darwinian and anatomically centered theories that sought merely to take apart 
the physics of the particular creature or organism. Uexküll saw the more 
important goal as understanding how these physical apparatuses all glue together 
to form into an (gestalt-like) umwelt for the particular creature composed of 
these parts (sensory receptors, motor effectors, etc.). Neither outside nor inside, 
the umwelt enables the outside to appear as such. In a sort of pre-Derridean “Il 
n'y a pas de hors-texte” (often translated as “nothing outside the text”, but 
better to say “there is no outside-text”), Uexküll pointed out that we should not 
look at the subject or its objects as merely entities with properties but as 
meaningful totalities each with its own containing bubble. In his famous essay ‘A 
Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men’ he presents pictorial figures that 
show his drawing-room from the ‘internal’ perspective of both a human and a 
dog, showing the different ‘views’ of these same objects that each subject has 
depending on the requirements of each of the species of which they are a 
member. While the dog, caught within the total “institution” of its species, sees  
only a mechanical reflection of its rather entrapped species-being, the human is 
faced with an infinitely plastic universe (habitus). An example of this plasticity of 
being: any recent western visitor to Uexküll’s drawing room would see something 
altogether different to what one of Uexküll’s contemporaries would have seen. 
Such would be the richness of differing historico-cultural possibilities and 
uncertainties available to the human ‘umwelt’. Human response versus animal 
reaction. The animal cannot itself inhabit a habitus (trapped a it is, without any 
ability for comportment, within its ‘disinhibiting ring’ (Heidegger 1995, p.253)). 
Influential on Heidegger, he himself creates a huge unbridgeable gap between 
animals and men that betrays a certain religious gathering, even in the midst of a 
scientific endeavor: “animals” in all their variety and variegatedness are huddled 
together on one side and are poor, while “men” all stand upright on the other 
side and are rich and open in their gathering of the world. 
lviii As I am programmed to do (in not being able to bear the ultimate 
responsibility for this questioning and to correspondingly tie everything that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
might be excessive down into a structurally non-leakey syntagm, and perhaps 
being evaded by a certain notionally whole quota of meaning that it is not mine 
(in the very immanence the writing) to control. This pre-prog-grammation, can 
only be matched and redoubled by a lack of perfect responsibility within the 
reading). 
lix And to beg the indulgence of the reader further in this somewhat clumsy and 
forced allusion to Heidegger’s ‘Question Concerning Technology’ we would say, as 
he does concerning technology, that the question concerning techlepathy is not 
itself a techlepathical question. Thus replacing technology with techleapthy each 
time, we might say: 
 Likewise, the essence of technology [techlepathy, etc.] is by no means 
 anything technological [techlepathical, etc.]. Thus we shall never 
 experience our relationship to the essence of technology so long as we 
 merely conceive and push forward the technological, put up with it, or 
 evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, 
 whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it 
 in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this 
 conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes 
 us utterly blind to the essence of technology (Heidegger 1977, p.4) 
lx (and of the remoteness of site or of our situatedness). Here we could add to the 
totality of this gaze a panop-tech-clair-voyance?. 
lxi Clarification: ‘being there’ (Da-sein) is of course Heidegger’s early master term 
par excellence (circa ‘Being and Time’) and refers to what exactly makes each 
and every dasein da-sein (we are the ontological being-there species whose 
quality is, ineluctably, as the species that takes-a-stand-on-its-being, one of 
being-there). Here we replace ‘being-there’ with ‘being-their’ to augment this 
spatial ontology of the desire of the panop-tech-clair-voyant relation. Whether 
this could place the relation within a resource of ‘standing-reserve’ (something 
Heidegger states is impossible for Dasein, as opposed to every other entity) 
would be a difficult and thorny question for another place. 
lxii This inevitably adds a sense input, which forms a sort of meta-sense input that 
would closely metaphorically mimic at least one of the accepted other five. A 
sixth sense is thus called upon which is a sense nonetheless. This supplement of 
a sixth sense however adds a dimension lacking in the poorer more accepted 
siblings. A telesthetic apparatus is thus born. A newer extra-sensory third-eye 
arises then that would see further but also see altogether differently; it 
penetrates deeper just as it penetrates otherwise. This third-eye would operate 
right from the captain’s inner eye without the need for the aspects of the physical 
vessel that the captain would rely upon: the captain here is in no need of the ship 
that he nevertheless is steering. The res cogitans sees purely outside of the 
embodied sensorium of the res extensa that nevertheless forms the contours of 
the very metaphoric interests that it needs as justification. Speaking of 
metaphorical extension, Hitschmann likens the myth of telepathy to “a psychic 
prosthesis, a stretched-out arm, which reaches out mystically toward that which 
is far off and cannot be approached in actuality by physical means” (p.126). Once 
the subject is subjected to psychoanalytic translation, the tele-language of 
telepathy gets reconverted into familial transactions displaced by the psyche.  
lxiii Perhaps most strange is a certain acceptance of the possibility of telepathy by 
the physicist Einstein. He wrote a short forward for a book on telepathy by the 
American social critic Upton Sinclair called ‘Mental Radio’. The book, again 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
suggesting the centrality of telepathy to the family circle, surrounding tests on his 
depressed second wife, reports on tests of her ability to read certain signifiers 
that she herself did not have sensorial access to through her five accepted 
senses. We will see in the footnote below the metaphoric importance of 
secondary prosthetic apparatuses for likening these telepathic internal 
apparatuses. 
lxiv Freud stated that: “What we call ‘telepathy’ is, as you know, the alleged fact 
that an event which occurs at a particular time comes at about the same moment 
to the consciousness of someone distant in space, without the paths of 
communication that are familiar to us coming into question. It is implicitly 
supposed that this event concerns a person in whom the other one (the receiver 
of intelligence) has a strong emotional interest. For instance, Person A may 
be the victim of an accident or may die, and Person B, someone nearly attached 
to him –his mother or daughter or fiancée- learns the fact at about the same time 
through a visual or auditory perception. In this latter case, then, it is as if she 
had been informed by telephone, though such was not the case:” Leaning 
against a comparison with a secondary prosthesis, Freud points to a primary 
prosthesis that in bypassing the primary communicative apparatuses, ends up 
taking on the qualities of what is counted as a graft. Again the presence of a prior 
“connection” allows for this primary-prosthesis to be something much less 
invasive or secondary than a graft or techno-graft. 
lxv some temporarily missing or misplaced postcards that finally made it to their 
recipient. Playing on Lacan’s message that a letter always reaches its destination, 
it seems that these postcards did not make it through to their recipient in time for 
being published in “Postcard: From Plato to Freud and Beyond”. These postcards 
speak of the character’s love for his lover… 
lxvi Although Derrida points out that Freud did not actually deliver these 
introductory lectures, but they make it into a transcription as delivered in this 
lively, public-forum way. 
lxvii Somnambulism is not of actuality or entelechy. Hegel sees actuality as an 
aggregate of interests that compose the individual who only comes together as 
“his genius” once out of an auto-matistic somnambulist stage (which would 
include base-clairvoyance (see Philosophy of Spirit, S.406) 
lxviii Indeed it would be hard to find a reference to any act of telepathy that did not 
serve to solidify a family relation and the family relation itself, as we will see, is 
what commun-icates itself to us via clair-voyance and this telesthetic telepathy. 
In an article titled ‘Telepathy and Psychoanalysis’ Edward Hitschmann, a close 
colleague of Freud’s, tells the story of the poet Max Dauthendey who had 
telepathic intimations of his father’s death and later received a tele-gram 
recording his father’s death as simultaneous with the thought he had earlier had. 
Hitschmann comes to explain this according to certain historical troubles within 
the trouble bubble of the family circle. But in a manner very similar to Freud (and 
Hegel) we find an ambivalence to telepathy that is something more than a middle 
ground, but where the family owns a sort of centralised position. Across a number 
of articles we find a vibrating indecision that at one time rejects and at another is 
more accepting. This splinter under the skin of the body of psychoanalysis finds 
within the family a very troubling and rather uncanny home or habitus that a 
more program-performative prosthetelepathy will come to inhabit in its turn, as 
we will see. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
lxix For want of interpreting after the fashion of Wallace, environment here seems 
to refer, not so much to a physicality of environment, but to an environment that 
seems a little like Uexküll’s umwelt bubble…. lxx	  That might then lead to the exsanguination of the figure of responsibility 
lxxi For this is not an invention, so much as an invention that, as we saw, pre-
invents something natural and inherent. An invention is something, by definition, 
that comes out of nowhere (and we are thinking along the lines here of Derrida’s 
dual concepts of l’avenir/futur and of the invention/discovery duality that he 
excavates in his presentation/essay ‘Of the Aforementioned Human Genome 
Project’. 
lxxii Warwick’s previous incarnation was as a British Telecom engineer, so 
telephony is something close to his heard, and no doubt something that haunted 
him in his youth, as he looked forward to inventions he is currently inventing. The 
end of the age of invention, he will show is not over with.  lxxiii	  Again as in footnote (**) above, Rickels in talking about vampires outlines an 
intimate historical relation between emergent technology and the occult, in the 
shape again of telepathy, and again, to continue a trend we seem to have set 
ourselves, within the helpful pedagogic language of the situated lecture format: 
 It does not matter whether the fantasy corresponds to fact; if it is doing a 
 number on you or inside you, it exists. Freud concluded that only his own 
 discovery of the unconscious and the invention of gadgets of live 
 transmission (his example is the telephone) had made it possible to 
 comprehend such occult mechanisms as telepathy. In other words, only 
 psychoanalysis understands vampirism in the context it shares with 
 technology or unmourning. Psychoanalysis and vampirism are rival 
 sciences of the undead (Rickels, The Vampire Lectures, p.32) 
The vampire just as he breaks the temporal-historical rule of abiding-within-his-
time also steals time in wishing to harbour it and uses the proper route also of 
familial communications technologies (which are obviously always historical, 
always furnishing a future) to divert proper energies: 
 At the control panel we find the vampire, the incarnation of telepathy 
 [although, as with Hegel’s questioning concerning clairvoyance, there are 
 questions hanging over telepathy, we see a more disfigured-familial 
 engineer at work in this figuration, than Rickels conveniently does here, 
 though we can see  his reasoning]. And how and where does Count 
 Dracula penetrate the west? What is his double point of entry? How are his 
 signals first picked up close range even as his ship’s off on the  horizon? 
 First his arrival is sensed by [or made to be sensed by?] Lucy…” 
 Not only then does the vampire steal or illicitly siphon-off a previously 
circulating blood that previously circulated in bodies proper and mortal for their 
own time (to steal the normally pumping or passing time and hold it static, as an 
improper prosthesis), he also steals and siphons-off the familial-blood circuitry of 
a telepathic communion that should belong and connect only to a Hegelian blood-
friend lover. Dracula here is a sort of illicit virus-blood-hacker, hacking into the 
channels of love to secure a time that belongs to the other. In such a circuitry the 
vampire forms a powerful metaphor for the flipside or of a negative circuitry of 
the positive circuitry-of-the-sun. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
lxxiv A theoretically exciting book titled ‘The Telephone Book’ by Avital Ronnell 
considers these envoi issues with telephonic communication which is very much 
in the spirit of Derrida’s (non-moralistic) questions concerning tele-technologies. 
Far from de-distancing the possibility of crossed-wires these technologies 
hauntologically allude and denude the “certainty” of paths of communication all 
the more. Similarly in the film ghostdance Derrida does not allow the post-feudal 
age of information technology to prevent the summoning of the ghostly or of the 
monstrous. 
lxxv For we would like to play with a thought  experiment where a third party 
might hack (or be invited) into a couple’s tech-clair-voyant circuitry. Just as the 
pornographic industries are to be found prowling close-by in greeting the births of 
almost all media opportunities so, no doubt, we can visualize a newer way of 
experiencing porn where we plug, as somewhat ‘interactive’ audiences, into a 
couple’s sexual activity. In a scene reminiscent of Spielberg’s ‘Minority Report’ we 
might find certain dirty old men plugging into (via a Warwickian embedded chip 
with credit-card payment options attached) certain apparatuses that interface 
with the interior of certain tele-distinguished bodies. In terms of the, now remote, 
possibility of a partner circumventing the watchful panoptic gaze of the ‘blood-
friend’ partner, one could foresee a ploy where a cheating spouse could convince 
their official blood-friend that they found the other to be pleasuring them through 
the devious syncing up a time where the person they really wanted to make love 
with was broadcasting their pleasure at the exact same time coordinate. What is 
to stop the official blood-friend from believing that it is them that is ‘supplying’ 
the transference of this signal-communication, rather than the one their partner 
would rather be with. “Were you thinking of someone else?”, might still then be a 
possibility in terms of a hacking-to-the-path-of-the-proper. Again, shades of the 
somewhat circuitous slidings from the gaze of the panopticon which remind one 
of Minority Report in steeling somebody else’s eyes to slip the iris identity gaze of 
a truth/identity-seeking state apparatus. And further outside of the proper-home 
of the blood-friend tech-clair-voyancing, could we not, somewhat perversely 
perhaps, vacariously be-towards-someone-else’s-death by embedding a chip in 
certain suicidal bodies in something not altogether different to a taped or filmed 
suicide (this latter has been attempted on YouTube). Interesting as these 
apparatuses would no doubt be, such secondary or even primary identification (as 
in the cinema) is never so easily transposable, as do we ever truly identify with 
ourselves before we come to gaze? But there are further issues that take us into 
the vicinity of the (Austinian) performance of  “the promise” and of any other 
first-person performatives, that depend upon the notion of an isolable causally 
responsible agency enveloped or wrapped up within their own secure decision-
making apparatuses. Following again further through the territory of these two 
rather frivolous thought experiments on thought-transfer, will there be any future 
need for the “I do” of the marriage ceremony, or further of the sexual intercourse 
that performatively secures the bond within its very securing (thus in this latter 
case obviating the very thing which the apparatus was invented to augment)? “I 
do”, as Derrida points out in SEC, only accomplishes the intentional transposal of 
an “itself” by also simultaneously allowing itself to not accomplish itself. As soon 
as there is no need for the “I do”, because there is not now any uncertainty of 
intention that would need the “transmission” of an expressive-indicative “I do”, 
there is also no longer the thing itself. For how can the thing exist outside also of 
its possible integral failure. Such is the strange logic of the performative which 
Derrida uncovered within Austin’s impressive lecture course upon the (excitable) 
saying that does things. 
